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THE MIRAGE OF USE RESTRICTIONS*
RIC SIMMONS**
The Fourth Amendment strikes a balance between Americans’
privacy interests and the government’s need to investigate crime.
It does so almost exclusively by placing restrictions on how the
government collects information: if the government surveillance
constitutes a “search,” the government must meet certain legal
standards before it can engage in that surveillance. Over the past
few decades, technological advances have exponentially
increased the government’s ability to collect information and
many of these new surveillance methods do not fit into the
traditional definitions of a Fourth Amendment search. In
response, courts and commentators have searched for new
doctrines to define and limit the government’s surveillance
power. One of the more popular proposals that has been
advanced is to force the government to adopt “use restrictions”—
limitations on what the government can do with information that
it collects or that is already in its possession. This new type of
restriction represents a significant shift from the current
paradigm of regulating government surveillance: a shift away
from regulating how information is collected and towards
regulating how the information is used.
Use restrictions on surveillance data have been termed the
“future of surveillance law.” They have been proposed in many
different contexts, such as restricting how the government can
process massive amounts of public data; limiting the use of
information from DNA databases; regulating the information
obtained through special needs searches; restricting the use of
information that law enforcement obtains after conducting a
search of a computer; or limiting the use of data from drones or
police body cameras.
This Article concludes that most types of use restrictions do not
have sufficient legal justifications. It first reviews the many
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possible applications of use restrictions and discusses five
potential doctrinal bases to justify them: (1) apply an “ongoing
seizure” doctrine; (2) create a purpose test for the exclusionary
rule; (3) re-define a “search” as including the processing of
information, not just its collection; (4) make the purpose of the
data collection a factor in determining whether collecting the data
is a search; and (5) limit which government agencies are allowed
access to the data that is collected. This Article then demonstrates
that most use restrictions cannot be justified by any of these
doctrinal bases. This Article further argues that adopting use
restrictions would be bad policy, since adopting restrictions
would discourage the creation of tighter collection restrictions,
give the government possession of vast amounts of our private
data, and in some cases unduly hinder legitimate law
enforcement functions. Therefore, this Article opposes the
movement towards use restrictions and proposes that courts and
legislatures maintain the focus of Fourth Amendment law on
collection restrictions and move forward with use restrictions
only in very limited circumstances.
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INTRODUCTION
Fourth Amendment law has undergone numerous dramatic
changes over the past fifty years. In 1967, the Supreme Court decided
Katz v. United States,1 shifting the Fourth Amendment focus from
property rights to privacy rights.2 Over the next few years the Court
would continue to make radical changes in this area of law: it created
an entirely new category of seizures and searches that do not require
a warrant or probable cause,3 approved a wide variety of widespread,
suspicionless searches as long as they were conducted for a non-law
enforcement purpose,4 permitted searches of arrestees even if there
was no chance of finding contraband or weapons,5 and allowed the
police free access to any information that a suspect shares with a third
party.6
Even though each of these cases represented radical changes in
Fourth Amendment law, they all shared the same fundamental
assumption that has formed the basis of nearly all Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence since the founding of our country: these
cases all focused on the collection of the information as the basis for
1. 398 U.S. 347 (1967).
2. Id. at 353.
3. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968) (holding that a law enforcement officer
may stop and conduct a limited search of a person if the officer “observes unusual
conduct,” reasonably concludes that criminal activity is underway and that the involved
persons may be armed, and identifies himself as a law enforcement officer and makes
reasonable inquiries).
4. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538–39 (1967) (allowing building
inspectors to obtain a warrant for a search using a decreased showing of probable cause);
see also New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 345–46 (1985) (allowing a school to search a
student’s purse without a warrant or probable cause).
5. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 218 (1973) (stating that custodial arrest
allows for a full search of the person without a warrant).
6. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979).
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deciding whether the Fourth Amendment was violated.7 Recently,
however, a truly revolutionary idea has begun to gain traction among
Fourth Amendment scholars and some courts: evaluating the
government action based on how the government uses the
information rather than how the government obtained the
information.
Use restrictions on government surveillance have been called the
“future of surveillance.”8 They have been hailed as an ingenious
solution to the twenty-first century’s most vexing Fourth Amendment
problems.9 New surveillance technologies such as drones and police
body cameras have provided police with unprecedented amounts of
data about our activities; use restrictions are seen as a way to ensure
that the police do not abuse this data.10 Police can use new methods of
information processing, popularly known as “big data,” to gain insight
into our private lives using seemingly innocuous bits of publically
available information; use restrictions could be imposed to prevent
police from this kind of intrusive investigation.11 Law enforcement
officers often need to search cell phones or computer hard drives that
contain enormous amounts of information, making the particularity
requirement for warrants obsolete; use restrictions can ensure that
the law enforcement officers only see (or can only use) the
information that is truly responsive to the warrant.12 And political
concerns about terrorism have pressured law enforcement officers to
seek to adopt ever more aggressive investigative tools to prevent acts
of mass destruction; use restrictions could ensure that the government

7. But see Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) (holding that in evaluating
special needs searches, courts should look to the “programmatic purpose” of the
government search regime).
8. Orin S. Kerr, Use Restrictions and the Future of Surveillance Law, FUTURE OF
THE CONST., Apr. 2011, at 3 https://www.brookings.edu/research/use-restrictions-and-thefuture-of-surveillance-law/ [https://perma.cc/4SNH-XVSE]. Professor Kerr argues that use
restrictions should come from statutes, not from the Fourth Amendment.
9. Orin S. Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital Evidence: The Case for Use
Restrictions on Nonresponsive Data, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2015); Elizabeth E.
Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 64
(2014).
10. See infra notes 189–215 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 51–78 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 137–39 (2d Cir. 2014) (restricting
the government’s authority to search the mirror image of a hard drive that had already
been seized); United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 996 (9th
Cir. 2009) (en banc), revised by 621 F.3d 1162, 1174 (9th Cir. 2010) (placing a use
restriction on law enforcement officers searching a hard drive).

96 N.C. L. REV. 133 (2017)

2017]

USE RESTRICTIONS

137

has access to these tools if they are necessary to combat terrorism, but
prohibit them from using the tools for general crime control.13
But for all the recent scholarly attention that use restrictions
have received, they are still not fully understood. The term “use
restriction” has been used to describe a number of different types of
regulations on how law enforcement can utilize information, some of
which are doctrinally sound, but many of which are not consistent
with current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Use restrictions can
be legally derived from a variety of sources, depending on the
context. Most fundamentally, use restrictions often create more
problems than they solve. Although at first pass use restrictions seem
to be elegant and sophisticated solutions to modern Fourth
Amendment puzzles, closer examination reveals that they involve
significant risks and may be less effective than they first appear.
Part I of this Article defines use restrictions and categorizes five
different models of use restrictions. It also examines the three
different sources that could (and in some cases, have already) become
the legal foundations for use restrictions. Part II examines eight
different contexts where use restrictions have been proposed or are
tentatively being utilized, such as DNA databases or digital searches.
Part III offers a critique of use restrictions by discussing the practical,
doctrinal, and political problems inherent in adopting use restrictions,
and argues that in many cases use restrictions would result in bad
policy. In a brief conclusion, the Article argues that use restrictions
promise much more than they can deliver, and that in most cases they
will do more harm than good.
I.

WHAT IS A “USE RESTRICTION?”

For the purposes of this Article, we will define “use restrictions”
as any legal restriction—whether constitutional, statutory, or
regulatory—constraining what law enforcement officials do with
information already in their possession.14 Law enforcement officials
may have obtained such information through surveillance that does
not implicate the Fourth Amendment (such as watching individuals in

13. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 8, at 3, 7–8.
14. This is similar to other definitions used by scholars. See, e.g., id. at 3 (defining “use
restrictions” as “rules that strictly regulate what the government can do with information
it has collected and processed”); Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use
Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 51 (1995) (arguing that use
restrictions should “confine[] the governmental authorities to uses consistent with the
[Fourth] Amendment’s reasonableness requirement”).
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a public place);15 through actions taken pursuant to a warrant
exception or the execution of a warrant; through information
obtained from a third party; or through information obtained from
other government officials. Use restrictions can be contrasted with
collection restrictions, which regulate how law enforcement officers
gather the information—and which, as of now, remains the primary
way in which the Constitution and legislatures regulate government
surveillance.
The idea of use restrictions is not new. In 1995, Professor Herald
Krent proposed adopting a use restriction regime, arguing that the
“reasonableness” of a law enforcement seizure should be judged
based on how the government subsequently uses the information
obtained from the seizure.16 Specifically, Krent argued that the courts
should ban any subsequent use of the information that was not
disclosed to the owner or at least implicit at the time of the seizure.17
He used two examples in his article: DNA evidence and items
recovered from lockers during school searches.18 But Krent saw many
potential future applications of his proposal, and pointed out that
“[g]overnmental officials may, as technology changes, acquire
increasing amounts of information about individuals.”19
Professor Krent’s proposal lay dormant for the better part of two
decades, as courts ignored the idea and other scholars paid it only
passing interest.20 Commentators most often cited the benefits of use
restrictions in the context of DNA databases, arguing that
government agencies that collect DNA evidence for the purpose of
verifying an individual’s identity should be barred from using the

15. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983) (allowing the
government to monitor the movement of a car during one trip over public roads).
16. See Krent, supra note 14, at 52.
17. Id. at 53, 85–92.
18. Id. at 93–99.
19. Id. at 53.
20. One exception was Professor Stephen Henderson, who argued in a 2005 article
that special needs searches could become more reasonable if government agents who
engage in surveillance for a certain purpose, such as looking for drugs in schools or
preventing terrorism, did not share the information with law enforcement officials.
Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine
of Fourth Amendment Searches, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 559–62 (2005). I also advocated
use restrictions in the narrow context of anti-terrorism searches, arguing that one way of
justifying suspicionless searches at airports and courthouses would be to prohibit the
government from using any evidence that resulted from those searches in a future criminal
trial, thus ensuring that the purpose of the search was limited to deterring terrorism. Ric
Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why Public Safety Is Not a Special Need, 59 DUKE L.J.
843, 915–19 (2010).
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evidence for any other purpose.21 In recent years, however, the idea
of use restrictions has been gaining traction. In 2011, Professor Orin
Kerr wrote that the “future of surveillance is a future of use
restrictions—rules that strictly regulate what the government can do
with information it has collected and processed.”22 Over the next few
years many other scholars agreed, arguing that “the age of big data
calls out for a new approach.”23 Use restrictions are now seen as a way
to regulate not only DNA samples24 but also the application of big
data in criminal investigations,25 the breadth of digital searches,26
drone surveillance,27 and national security surveillance.28
A. Different Types of Use Restrictions
As seen in Part II, those who argue in favor of use restrictions
make compelling practical arguments as to how this new paradigm
could resolve some of the trickiest Fourth Amendment issues
currently faced by the courts. But before proponents can discuss the
practical applications of use restrictions, they must first provide a
doctrinal basis for adopting this new approach to regulating
surveillance. In other words, we need to determine what legal theory
supports restricting the government’s use of data that it has legally
obtained. So far, the various proponents have put forward five
different theories supporting the imposition of use restrictions:
(i) Applying an “ongoing seizure” doctrine;
(ii) Creating a purpose test for the exclusionary rule;
(iii) Defining the data processing itself as a “search”;
21. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561, 1605–06
(2012).
22. Kerr, supra note 9, at 3. (arguing that use restrictions should come from statutes,
not from the Fourth Amendment).
23. Joh, supra note 9, at 63–65.
24. See generally Tracey Maclin, Government Analysis of Shed DNA Is a Search
Under the Fourth Amendment, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 287 (2015) (exploring Fourth
Amendment implications of government analysis of covertly collecgted DNA).
25. Joh, supra note 9, at 63–65; Stephen E. Henderson, Our Records Panopticon and
the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 699, 722–
23 (2014).
26. Kerr, supra note 9, at 48 (arguing for a use restriction for non-responsive files in
computer warrant searches).
27. Caren Myers Morrison, Dr. Panopticon, or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love the Drone, 27 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 747, 758 (2015).
28. See Russell D. Covey, Pervasive Surveillance and the Future of the Fourth
Amendment, 80 MISS. L.J. 1289, 1303–05 (2011) (arguing that given the destructive power
available to criminals today, the government needs to aggressively use surveillance
technology, and the only way to allow this and maintain basic civil liberties is to limit the
use of the information that is gathered).
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(iv) Making the expected future use of the data collection a
factor in determining whether the collection itself is
constitutional; or
(v) Sequestering the information to specific government
agencies.
Each of these theories has different benefits and drawbacks, and none
of them are mutually exclusive. Thus, courts (and legislatures) could
adopt any or all of them, depending on the context.
1. “Ongoing Seizures”
The first doctrinal basis to support the imposition of use
restrictions would be for courts to hold that the improper use of
legally gathered information transforms the legal seizure into an
illegal one. This was Professor Krent’s initial proposal regarding the
use of DNA that had been legally collected29 and it has found some
support in more modern scholarship. For example, a recent article by
Professor Kerr proposed use restrictions on warrant-authorized
searches of digital evidence.30 Kerr argues that when the government
(lawfully) seizes a computer and its data pursuant to a warrant, the
government’s continued retention of that data is an ongoing seizure.31
Courts agree that the initial seizure of that data will necessarily
include data that is authorized by the warrant and data that is not
authorized by the warrant, since all the information will be
commingled in the suspect’s computer.32 Thus, the initial seizure of
unauthorized data is inevitable and constitutional.33 However, once
the government starts sifting through the data, it will begin to
separate the data authorized by the warrant from the unauthorized
data. If the government later uses the unauthorized data, it exceeds
the scope of the warrant and its ongoing seizure of the unauthorized
data becomes unconstitutional.34 As we will see in Part II, the
“ongoing seizure” argument can apply to use restrictions in many
other contexts in which the government legally collects and then
retains data (such as DNA databases) or information shared with
third parties (such as phone records or search engine queries).

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Krent, supra note 14, at 53.
Kerr, supra note 9, at 17–18.
Id. at 24–29.
Id. at 11–12.
Id.
Id.
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2. Linking the Exclusionary Rule to the Purpose of the Search
The second way to impose use restrictions would be to broaden
the exclusionary rule35 so that it would bar the use of any evidence
that was inconsistent with the initial purpose of the search. In other
words, if the court permits the government to conduct a search in
order to fulfill a certain purpose, then the government can only use
the results of that search for that specific, articulated purpose. The
results would be inadmissible if used for any other purpose.36
This justification of use limitations would not apply to most
searches, since Fourth Amendment jurisprudence generally focuses
only on the level of suspicion possessed by the law enforcement
officer and is unconcerned with the reason why the officer conducted
the search. However, there is a category of Fourth Amendment
searches—special needs searches—which are entirely dependent on
the purpose of the search.37 For example, the government does not
need to show any level of individualized suspicion before setting up a
roadblock to stop drivers, as long as the purpose of the roadblock is
to detect drunk drivers and keep the roads safe.38 Under traditional
Fourth Amendment law, any information that is recovered as a result
of a stop is admissible for any purpose, even though the stop was only
authorized for a limited purpose.39 But under a use limitation theory
of the exclusionary rule, the evidence recovered could not be used in
any case unrelated to the purpose of the special needs search.
Returning to the example, if the roadblock was constitutionally
permissible only because of the special need to apprehend drunk
drivers, any evidence obtained during the stop would only be
35. Under the exclusionary rule, the government is prohibited from introducing
evidence that was obtained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights, unless one of
the many exceptions to the rule applies. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(establishing the exclusionary rule for all state court criminal cases).
36. Covey, supra note 28, at 1311–12 (“When any type of state search or seizure
activity that normally would be subjected to traditional Fourth Amendment standards is
exempted from those standards under the administrative or special needs doctrines, the
state’s right to use information obtained thereby should be restricted to the purposes that
justified the exemption in the first place.”).
37. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (holding that probable
cause for a health inspector to enter a home is lower because the purpose of the search is
not related to traditional law enforcement).
38. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990); but see
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) (stating roadblocks are not permitted for
purely law enforcement purposes, such as searching for narcotics).
39. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996) (noting that even if
the legal justification of the stop were a pretext, the police would still be allowed to use
any evidence they obtained from the stop as long as the initial justification for the stop was
legal).

96 N.C. L. REV. 133 (2017)

142

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

admissible to prove the defendant was driving while intoxicated—so
any drugs, illegal weapons, or other contraband found during the
roadblock would be excluded from evidence. In some ways this
doctrine would be a sensible limitation on special needs searches, but
as we will see below,40 it would have far-reaching (and politically
unappetizing) implications for anti-terrorism searches.
3. Broadening “Fourth Amendment Searches” to Include
Processing or Distributing Data
A third legal justification of use restrictions would be to broaden
the definition of a Fourth Amendment “search”41 to include not just
the collection of data but also the actions that the government takes
with the data after the collection has occurred. Many commentators
have proposed this as an antidote to the vast amounts of data that are
currently being legally collected by the government in different
contexts, such as the DNA taken from arrestees that ends up in
government databases and the metadata from phone calls that is
collected by third parties and handed over to criminal investigators.42
Under this theory, the processing of the data the government legally
possesses would be considered a search in its own right. Thus, the
government would need to obtain a warrant or demonstrate
reasonableness to a court before processing the data. This is similar
to, but distinct from, the “ongoing seizure” doctrine discussed earlier.
Under the “ongoing seizure” doctrine, information can be validly
seized at one point in time pursuant to a warrant and then used only
for a specific purpose—any further use of the seized data would
constitute a new Fourth Amendment seizure under the law and would
thus require a new warrant. Under the processing or distributing data
doctrine, the original seizure of the information poses no Fourth
Amendment issues, but any sophisticated processing or extensive
sharing of the information would be considered a Fourth Amendment
search.
This broader definition of “search” is not consistent with existing
Fourth Amendment doctrine,43 and also requires courts to draw
difficult lines about the point at which a further use of alreadycollected data becomes a new search. For example, if a computer
40. See infra notes 247–48 and accompanying text.
41. U.S. CONST. amend, IV (“The right of the people to be secure . . . against
unreasonable searches . . . shall not be violated . . . .”).
42. See, e.g., Logan, supra note 21, at 1605–06 (arguing that the courts should restrict
the use of “identity information” that the government possesses).
43. See infra Section III.A.1.
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processes information but does not share it with human beings, has a
second “search” occurred? What about when police aggregate data to
predict the location of future criminal activity?
4. Evaluating a Search Based on the Expected Future Use of the
Data
The fourth proposed basis for creating use restrictions is similar,
but subtly distinct. It involves courts evaluating the constitutionality
of a search, in part by looking to the purpose for which the
information will later be used. This type of use restriction requires
less of a doctrinal shift than the previous method, since the definition
of a Fourth Amendment “search” will still refer to the collection of
data, not its actual use. Under this doctrine, the courts will look to the
purpose of the search as well as the manner of the search.
Courts already apply this type of use restriction when they
analyze searches under the special needs doctrine. When the
government collects certain information for a non-law enforcement
purpose, such as conducting drug tests on train operators to ensure
the safety of train passengers, courts will apply the more lenient
“reasonableness” standard rather than the higher standard of
probable cause.44 So far, courts have only applied this sort of use
restriction in the context of special needs45—that is, asking whether
the purpose of the search is to advance a law enforcement goal or to
further some other goal. A more aggressive application of use
restrictions could be imposed to create many different kinds of
distinctions between different proposed uses. For example, courts
could hold that collecting DNA for the purposes of establishing an
arrestee’s identity was a reasonable search, but collecting DNA for
the purposes of learning more intimate details about the suspect
would be an unreasonable search.46
5. Sequestering
Finally, courts or legislatures could restrict access to the
previously collected information based on the government agency’s
seeking the information. This limitation usually means sequestering
44. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 618–20 (1989)
(applying the “reasonableness” standard rather than the warrant requirement or the
probable cause standard); see also infra Part II.C.
45. See infra notes 97–126 and accompanying text.
46. In fact, some have argued that the Supreme Court did exactly this in Maryland v.
King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1977 (2013) (allowing the gathering of DNA evidence from arrestees
if the information is used for identification purposes). See infra Section II.B.
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law enforcement agencies—creating a “wall” between the non-law
enforcement agency that gathered the information (and can generally
use it for whatever purpose that is within its agency’s mandate) and
law enforcement. For example, if the National Transportation Safety
Board (“NTSB”) were to require all self-driving cars to report their
location to the government at all times in order to ensure safety on
the roadways, the NTSB could only use the location information for
the purpose of ensuring safe roads and could not share it with law
enforcement officials for crime control purposes. As different
branches of the government gather increasing amounts of information
for diverse purposes, the imposition of this type of use restriction
could be a way to allow other agencies to continue doing their job
while still preventing law enforcement from gaining access to a vast
and growing database of private information.
B.

Different Methods of Creating Use Restrictions

Any of the five identified use restrictions would need a basis in
legal authority to be imposed on law enforcement conduct. There are
three potential sources of legal authority that can be used to justify
use restrictions.
First, courts could interpret the Fourth Amendment as requiring
certain types of use restrictions. With respect to the first three types
of use restrictions, this would require a radical shift in Fourth
Amendment doctrine, which currently regulates searches and seizures
at the collection stage rather than at any subsequent stage. And as
with any new doctrine, it would require a significant amount of
litigation as the Supreme Court and then various circuit courts carved
out the scope of the various forms of use restrictions one case at a
time.
Second, magistrates and district court judges could impose use
restrictions into search warrants as a way of complying with the
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.47 This poses less
of a doctrinal challenge, since magistrates and judges who issue
warrants have broad discretion to add in specific requirements when
crafting warrants, and there is no legal reason why use restrictions
could not be part of these requirements. However, since this method
imposes use restrictions into warrants, it is obviously limited to
situations in which the government is already seeking a warrant, and
so it would not affect the vast majority of surveillance that occurs. It is
47. See U.S. CONST., amend. IV (requiring all warrants to “particularly describe[]” the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized).
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probably most useful for the third type of use restriction—the
“ongoing seizure”—since many of those seizures are made pursuant
to a warrant. This process of creating use restrictions would probably
involve circuit court judges enforcing the particularity clause to
overturn warrants which did not include a use restriction, thus forcing
district court judges and magistrates to routinely include use
restrictions when issuing warrants.
Finally, legislatures could create use statutes which require
restrictions in certain contexts. This would also pose no challenge to
current Fourth Amendment doctrine, and it would allow legislatures
to fine-tune use restrictions to very narrow factual contexts. And as
we will see, legislatures have already created numerous use
restrictions in the areas of criminal justice and privacy.48 However,
encouraging legislatures to create use restrictions would end up
further complicating search and seizure doctrine, making it harder for
law enforcement officials to know how they could legally use their
collected data in different contexts. Additionally, different state
legislatures could craft different solutions for their jurisdictions,
leading to a lack of uniformity.49 Furthermore, legislatures may face
strong political resistance if they try to impose use restrictions in
certain contexts.50
II. POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS FOR USE RESTRICTIONS
The previous Section examined how use restrictions could be
created—both the potential doctrinal basis for use restrictions and the
practical ways that they could be enacted into law. This Part turns to
the next question: how would use restrictions be used? In other
words, in what factual scenarios would use restrictions be helpful,
what are the pros and cons of adopting use restrictions in each of
these areas, and to what degree have courts already adopted use
restrictions? Over the past few years, use restrictions have been
proposed in many different contexts as a way to solve numerous
seemingly intractable Fourth Amendment problems. In some areas,
courts and legislatures have already moved towards adopting a

48. See infra Section III.A.2.
49. This lack of uniformity is also an issue when state courts interpret their state
constitutions to give greater protections than the federal constitution, but the
complications multiply significantly with the entry of state legislatures into the picture.
50. Use restrictions would mean that in some situations law enforcement officers who
possessed evidence of criminal activity could not use that evidence to prove that the
perpetrator committed the crime. This limitation would be politically unpopular with
many voters. See infra text accompanying note 248.
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version of use restrictions in evaluating the constitutionality of the
government action. This Part provides an overview of eight different
contexts in which use restrictions are becoming a reality: the mosaic
theory doctrine, DNA databanks, special needs searches, national
security, digital searches, drones and body cameras, the binary search
doctrine, and encryption.
A. Mosaic Theory
The mosaic theory is a relatively new concept that has been
garnering a considerable amount of attention among commentators51
and has begun to gain traction in the Supreme Court.52 The mosaic
theory holds that aggregating many small, seemingly innocuous bits of
data about a person can reveal detailed, intimate information about a
person’s life.53 The small bits of data could take on many forms, such
as the individual locations that a person visits, metadata about
telephone calls or internet uses, or specific credit card purchases.
The implications of the mosaic theory for Fourth Amendment
doctrine are profound, since the government can often collect these
small bits of data without implicating the Fourth Amendment. Often,
individuals share these data points with third parties, and thus the
data are freely available to the government under the third-party
rule.54 In other contexts, the data consists of information in which the
individual never had any reasonable expectation of privacy in the first
place, such as a person’s location in a public place55 or address
51. See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 311, 314 (2012); see also David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking
Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381, 390 (2013); Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United
States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 4 (2012).
52. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) (noting that one of the reasons cell
phones require more protections than other “containers” is that the distinct types of
information in the phone can “reveal much more in combination than any isolated
record”); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see
also infra note 66 and accompanying text. Although Jones and Riley hinted that the Court
was moving towards adopting the mosaic theory, the Court has not yet formally adopted
the doctrine.
53. As two commentators recently described it, the mosaic theory holds that “we can
maintain reasonable expectations of privacy in certain quantities of information and data
even if we lack reasonable expectations of privacy in the constituent parts of those
wholes.” See Gray & Citron, supra note 51, at 397.
54. The Supreme Court has held that an individual has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in any information that she provides to a third party. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 743 (1979) (applying the third-party doctrine to phone numbers dialed on a telephone
call).
55. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983).
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information on an email.56 Thus, the collection of each individual
piece of information does not implicate the Fourth Amendment, but
under the mosaic theory, aggregating them together in certain ways
becomes a “search” and thus would implicate the Fourth
Amendment.
The mosaic theory has become more significant as technology
has allowed for more bulk collection of data by the government and
private companies. The growing literature about the use of “big data”
by law enforcement is yet another manifestation of applying the
mosaic theory to the Fourth Amendment.57 The use of big data raises
a number of interesting questions, such as whether, and to what
degree, predictive algorithms can be used to create reasonable
suspicion or probable cause.58 But even before courts reach those
questions, they will have to decide whether the bulk collection and/or
processing of the information constitutes a Fourth Amendment
search.
Courts could incorporate the mosaic theory into Fourth
Amendment doctrine in two different ways. First, courts could rule
that the Fourth Amendment restricts the bulk collection of data; that
is, even though collecting any single piece of data may not be a
search, collecting hundreds of pieces of the same type of data would
be a search. This is essentially the Fourth Amendment theory that
was adopted by the four concurring Justices in United States v. Jones59
who held that continuously tracking a suspect’s movements along
public roads for twenty-eight days is a search.60
56. United States v. Forrester, 495 F.3d 1041, 1048–50 (9th Cir. 2007).
57. See generally Jane Bambauer, Hassle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 461 (2015) (arguing that
the use of big data conflicts with the individualized suspicion requirement of the Fourth
Amendment); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion,
163 U. PA. L. REV. 327 (2015) [hereinafter Ferguson, Reasonable Suspicion] (imagining
the use of big data by police on the street to determine whether reasonable suspicion
exists for a Terry stop); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable
Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259 (2012) (examining how big data can be used by police to
generate reasonable suspicion); Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion:
Automated Suspicion, Big Data, and Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15 (2016)
(arguing for more accountability in the way police use big data to allocate their
surveillance resources); Joh, supra note 9 (defining “big data” as the application of
artificial intelligence to vast amounts of digitized data).
58. See Ferguson, Reasonable Suspicion, supra note 57, at 388–403; Ric Simmons,
Quantifying Criminal Procedure: How to Unlock the Potential of Big Data in Our Criminal
Justice System, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 947, 969–83 (2016).
59. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
60. Id. at 429–31 (Alito, J., concurring). The majority opinion based its conclusion
that there was a search in this context on a trespass-based theory: since the government
physically placed a GPS tracker on the individual’s car, a search had occurred. Id. at 404–
05 (majority opinion).
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This interpretation of the Fourth Amendment presents serious
challenges to current Fourth Amendment doctrine. If collecting one
point of data is not a search, how could collecting a series of the same
type of data become a search? At what point does a series of nonsearches suddenly become a search?61 Courts could answer these
questions by applying Katz’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” test
in every context in which the mosaic theory applies.62 For example, a
court could rule that a suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy is
violated when the police track public movements for twenty-eight
days, or collect over twenty search engine queries over a one-week
period, or collect six months’ worth of phone records. But this
approach would require dozens of different cases to set out the
parameters of the theory and could result in disparate standards that
would create ambiguity or inconsistency.63
The second option of incorporating the mosaic theory is to turn
to use restrictions. Under this option, the rules on collecting data
would remain the same: obtaining data from public sources or third
parties would not be a search regardless of the volume of data which
is collected. But aggregating the data and drawing conclusions from
those aggregations would be deemed a search. This is an example of
the “data processing” rationale.64 The aggregation could be relatively
unsophisticated, such as a police officer reviewing an entire month’s
worth of GPS data to determine patterns and deviations from those
patterns. Or it could be more complex, such as the software used by
the National Security Administration that sifts through millions of cell
phone records to predict criminal activity. In any case, the courts
would consider the aggregation to be a separate search and then

61. See Kerr, supra note 51, at 333–34. Professor Kerr focuses on four problems that
the mosaic theory creates for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. First, what is the
standard for determining when a “mosaic” is created? Second, what types of grouping
count as making a mosaic? Third, how is it determined when a mosaic is “reasonable,”
especially given the fact that all of its constituent parts are reasonable on their own. And
fourth, what is the remedy for mosaic searches? Id. at 329–30.
62. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(“[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
63. Professor Christopher Slobogin has proposed a statute that would codify when an
otherwise innocuous surveillance becomes a Fourth Amendment search under the mosaic
theory. Slobogin, supra note 51, at 24. His proposal relies on restricting the surveillance at
the collection stage, for example: “[a] targeted public search that lasts longer than 20
minutes in aggregate but no longer than 48 hours in aggregate requires reasonable
suspicion.” Id. at 24.
64. See supra Section I.A.3.
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analyze whether that aggregation represented a Fourth Amendment
violation.
Just like the more traditional model of the mosaic theory
advocated by the Jones concurrence, the data-processing use
restriction of adopting the mosaic theory would require a revision of
Fourth Amendment doctrine, since the Fourth Amendment has
traditionally only applied to the data collection phase of the
investigation. However, this rationale could avoid the problem of
drawing arbitrary lines about the exact point at which massive data
collection becomes a search. In this way, adopting a use restriction
theory of the Fourth Amendment could legitimize and simplify the
mosaic theory. Courts would no longer need to restrict the length of
the surveillance or determine how many different data points would
constitute a search. Instead, courts would focus on how law
enforcement officers grouped the different data points together. If
law enforcement officers wanted to obtain massive amounts of public
information, the Fourth Amendment would allow such acquisition.
And if a law enforcement officer then needed to look at one piece of
that information—that is, to determine whether the suspect was at a
certain place at a certain time, or whether he placed a phone call to a
certain person on a specific day—the officer could verify that without
violating the suspect’s rights. But if the law enforcement officer
utilized the entire packet of information to seek out patterns, or used
a software algorithm to determine probable cause, she would be
conducting a Fourth Amendment search.
Of course, this application of the Fourth Amendment still
requires courts to determine which types of data aggregation
constitute a search, but these distinctions would be easier and more
intuitive to draw because they would be more closely tied to the
results the law enforcement officers obtain rather than the actions that
the officers take. Take the example of Jones. The concurrence in
Jones told us that twenty-eight days of surveillance along public roads
is a search.65 This leaves lower courts and police officers with the
inevitable question of whether twenty-five days of surveillance is
permissible, or fifteen days, or ten days. Not only are such distinctions
arbitrary, they miss the point of the mosaic theory. The real privacy
invasion that the mosaic theory seeks to address is not the amount of
information that the government obtains; it is the information that
law enforcement is able to learn from looking at the patterns from the
65. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at
430–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
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aggregated data. It would make more sense for a court to examine
how the law enforcement officers analyze the information—what
conclusions they are capable of drawing given their analysis—and
determine whether the information from that analysis violates the
suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This, after all, is the
rationale behind the mosaic theory: that through aggregating data,
new truths (or at least probabilities) can be gleaned from otherwise
harmless information.66 Applying a use restriction to the information
would place a court’s focus where it belongs: on the aggregation of
the data, not its original collection.67
Although applying use restrictions seems to present courts with
an elegant way out of the doctrinal dilemma posed by the mosaic
theory, courts have been reluctant to move in this direction. Jones is
the only Supreme Court case that has touched on collecting large
amounts of data, and the Justices for the most part refused to adopt a
use restriction analysis when applying the mosaic theory. The four
concurring Justices that adopted a version of the mosaic theory
explained that it was the “prolonged” nature of the surveillance that
made it a Fourth Amendment search, arguing that society’s
reasonable expectation has traditionally been that law enforcement
agents could follow a person on one trip, but they would not and
could not monitor a person’s movements for an extended period of
time.68 In other words, they focused on the bulk collection of the data
and did not concern themselves with what the government did with
the data once it had been collected. Only Justice Sotomayor hinted
that what the government did with the data raised Fourth
Amendment concerns; and this was a very subtle hint indeed.69
Lower courts have also been disinclined to apply a use limitation
in cases invoking extensive data collection. Before the Jones case was
66. See Kerr, supra note 51, at 313.
67. For many privacy advocates, however, utilizing use restrictions to justify the
mosaic theory is insufficient, since law enforcement officers would be permitted to possess
enormous stores of data about anyone they chose to monitor. The mere fact that the
government holds this information—even in raw form, and even if no member of law
enforcement actually ever looks at it—could still be seen as an infringement of privacy.
Furthermore, there is a question of enforcement: just because the police are not permitted
to examine this information in the aggregate without a warrant does not mean that all
members of law enforcement will follow this rule. These critiques (which are common to
nearly every type of use restriction) are considered in Part III.
68. See 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring).
69. See id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I would ask whether people
reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that
enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious
beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.” (emphasis added)).
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appealed to the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit held that the
twenty-eight-day surveillance of the defendant was a Fourth
Amendment search, and even cited the mosaic theory as one of the
reasons why the prolonged warrantless surveillance violated the
defendant’s rights.70 But the court stopped short of embracing a use
restriction theory, instead focusing on the concept that the
government could see a broader view of the defendant’s life,
revealing patterns of conduct instead of isolated trips. The closest the
D.C. Circuit came to mentioning any kind of use restriction was its
statement that an individual expects each of his movements to remain
“disconnected and anonymous,” and by connecting the separate trips
together, law enforcement transforms individual legal searches into
an intimate portrait.71 Thus, one could argue that monitoring many
separate trips is not a search, but the act of “connecting” the trips
together after the monitoring becomes a search. But this seems like a
stretch; what the D.C. Circuit was really objecting to (like the
Supreme Court concurrences later) was the prolonged nature of the
surveillance, not the manipulation or processing of the data
afterwards.
Even courts presiding over cases that review extremely massive
amounts of surveillance data have refused to adopt use restrictions on
the government. In recent years there have been a spate of lawsuits
surrounding the Internet surveillance conducted by the National
Security Agency (“NSA”).72 In one of those cases, a district court
judge granted an injunction against the NSA, arguing that the thirdparty doctrine no longer applies in the context of bulk collection of
metadata.73 Although the court did briefly discuss the data mining
that the government was able to perform,74 it based its ruling on many
70. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 561–63 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom.,
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
71. Id. at 563 (Breitel, J., concurring) (quoting Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255
N.E.2d 765, 772 (N.Y. 1970)).
72. The group ProPublica has compiled a list of approximately forty lawsuits that
have been filed since 2006 regarding the NSA’s mass surveillance program. See Kara
Brandeisky, NSA Surveillance Lawsuit Tracker, PROPUBLICA (July 10, 2013),
https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/surveillance-suits (last updated May 13, 2015)
[http://perma.cc/3SNB-NZC3]. These lawsuits can be roughly divided into three
categories: lawsuits that seek to compel the NSA to release information about its
surveillance programs; lawsuits by criminal defendants who are challenging the use of
covert NSA surveillance in their criminal case; and lawsuits that claim that the NSA
surveillance violates the NSA’s statutory authority and/or the Constitution.
73. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 30–38 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and
remanded, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
74. Id. at 33 (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)) (“[T]he
Government has at its disposal today the most advanced twenty-first century tools,
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other factors as well, including the length of time that the NSA
program was collecting information, the close cooperation between
the government and the third-party companies who provided the
information, and the “nature and quantity” of the information that
was being gathered.75 Meanwhile, a district court judge in New York
ruled that the NSA surveillance program did not violate the
Constitution, regardless of what the government did with the massive
amounts of information that it collected.76
In short, even though use restrictions would be an elegant and
sensible way to justify applying the mosaic doctrine, so far courts have
been reluctant to adopt this new approach to applying the Fourth
Amendment. This same judicial reluctance exists in other areas where
adopting use restrictions would seem sensible, including regulation of
DNA evidence77 and the application of the special needs doctrine.78
B.

DNA Databanks

Professor Krent’s original article cited DNA samples as one of
the primary contexts in which use restrictions would be useful.79 This
is an especially compelling area for use restrictions for a number of
reasons: DNA samples are easily collected, they serve a critical nonintrusive purpose (establishing identity), and they contain vast
amounts of information that could reveal intimate details about a
person. But the best argument for use restrictions in this context is the
paucity of constitutional restrictions on the collection of DNA
samples. Taking a DNA sample directly from a person’s body is
considered a “search,” but the Court has found such a search to be
reasonable when conducted on an individual who has been arrested
for a felony.80 More significantly, the collection of “abandoned”
DNA—genetic material that is unavoidably left behind in public
places—is completely unregulated by the Fourth Amendment.81 Thus,
DNA represents a type of information which is: (1) easily accessible

allowing it to ‘store such records and efficiently mine them for information years into the
future.’”).
75. Id. at 30–38.
76. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, and remanded, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015).
77. See infra Section II.B.
78. See infra Section II.C.
79. See Krent, supra note 14, at 93–97.
80. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
81. See, e.g., State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 37 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (finding “no cases
or support” for the defendant’s argument that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the DNA in his saliva that he voluntarily placed on an envelope).

96 N.C. L. REV. 133 (2017)

2017]

USE RESTRICTIONS

153

(both practically and legally); (2) essential and uncontroversial when
used for one purpose; and (3) invasive when used for other purposes.
Intuitively, using DNA to establish a suspect’s identity might seem
“reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment, but storing it in a
permanent database, using it to investigate cold cases, or analyzing it
to learn more personal information about the suspect may seem less
reasonable.
When Professor Krent originally proposed use restrictions for
DNA evidence twenty years ago, he proposed two different ways that
use restrictions could be applied to DNA evidence. First, the legality
of the DNA collection could be conditioned on the presumption that
the DNA would only be used in certain ways82—what this Article has
termed the “future use” rationale.83 If law enforcement seeks a
warrant to conduct the search, this method works well because a
court can set out conditions in the warrant that restrict how the
information is used.84 However, DNA samples may be obtained
without a warrant,85 thus making it difficult to impose any use
restrictions at the collection stage without a significant adjustment to
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Instead, courts would have to
adopt Professor Krent’s second option, which is to categorize certain
uses of DNA as a separate search, distinct from the collection itself.86
Indeed, most modern proposals for DNA use restrictions adopt this
argument. Professor Wayne Logan argues that “[w]hen government
uses identity evidence forensically—to investigate an arrestee’s
possible role in other criminal activity—a distinct government
purpose (and hence search) is pursued.”87 Similarly, Professor Tracey
Maclin has argued that “[g]overnment analysis of shed DNA is a
search under the Fourth Amendment.”88 This rationale for use
restrictions is a cross between the “ongoing seizure” model89 and the
“processing data” model.90 If keeping millions of samples of DNA in
82. See Krent, supra note 14, at 86–93.
83. See supra Section I.A.4.
84. This is the argument made to justify use restrictions of certain types of digital
evidence. See infra notes 165–183 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (allowing for warrantless collection of DNA
samples from felony arrestees); Athan, 158 P.3d at 37 (confirming that no warrant is
required to collect “abandoned” DNA).
86. See Krent, supra note 14, at 95–98 (“The fact that the government legitimately
obtained the sample . . . should not be determinative. Rather, the government’s planned
use of the blood sample must pass the Fourth Amendment hurdle . . . .”).
87. Logan, supra note 21, at 1605.
88. Maclin, supra note 24, at 312.
89. See supra Section I.A.1.
90. See supra Section I.A.3.
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storage until they can be used in future cases is deemed a Fourth
Amendment violation, the use restriction belongs in the “ongoing
seizure” category. But if detailed analysis of the DNA is deemed a
Fourth Amendment violation, the use restriction would be justified
under the “processing data” rationale.91
As in the mosaic theory context, the Supreme Court recently had
the opportunity to impose use restrictions on DNA evidence, and (at
least for now) it refused to do so. In Maryland v. King, 92 the Court
held that swabbing the inside of a suspect’s mouth and then analyzing
the DNA was a “search,” but that the search was “reasonable” if
conducted on felony arrestees.93 The Court did note in dicta that the
limited purpose of the search (identification of the suspect) was a
significant factor in its determination that the search was reasonable,
and the Court further noted that “[i]f in the future police analyze
samples to determine, for instance, an arrestee’s predisposition for a
particular disease or other hereditary factors not relevant to identity,
that case would present additional privacy concerns not present
here.”94 Thus, the Court explicitly left open the possibility of use
restrictions in a future case, and implied that the very act of analyzing
samples was an independent search because such an act would
“present additional privacy concerns.”95 The Court also pointed out
that the Maryland law authorizing this procedure stated that “only
DNA records that directly relate to the identification of individuals
shall be collected and stored.”96
However, the Court stopped short of holding that the act of
analyzing the DNA constituted a search, instead rooting its argument
firmly within the traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine that focuses
on the act of collection.97 In other words, the Court held that DNA

91. A similar doctrinal question arises in the context of “familial DNA searches,” in
which the government runs a DNA sample against a database of known criminals and
finds a partial match, indicating that the person who contributed the sample is not a
match, but a close family member probably is. Even if the courts decide that processing
DNA is a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, it is not clear that the family member
would have standing to challenge the processing, since it is the contributor’s sample that is
being processed. See Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative
Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1094–95 (2016) (arguing for application of
administrative law principles to regulate massive aggregation of collected data).
92. 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
93. Id. at 1980.
94. Id. at 1979.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1979–80 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(b)(1) (West,
Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.)).
97. Id.
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collection made for the purposes of identification was a reasonable
search and implied that collection made for a different purpose might
not be—the Court never stated that the analysis of the DNA itself
was a search.98 This is a subtle distinction, but an important one,
because it demonstrates that King does not actually establish a
doctrinal foundation for use restrictions.
In contrast to King, an earlier Fourth Circuit case, United States
v. Davis,99 held that analysis of DNA samples constitutes a search,
because “the individual retains a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the information obtained from the testing.”100 The King Court refused
to explicitly adopt this position. Indeed, the Maryland Supreme Court
cited King a year later in a case that held that analyzing DNA for the
purposes of identification is not a search.101
C.

Special Needs Searches

A “special needs” search is (in theory) a type of government
surveillance which is undertaken for a non-law enforcement purpose.
Such purposes have included ensuring the safety of railway
passengers,102 maintaining a positive learning environment in
schools,103 or securing the country’s borders.104 In practice, the line
between a search pursuant to a “law enforcement purpose” and a
search pursuant to a “non-law enforcement purpose” can become
blurred.105 For example, the Court approved drunk driving
checkpoints for the “non-law enforcement purpose” of keeping the
roadway safe;106 while circuit courts approve searches at airports for
the “non-law enforcement purpose” of maintaining airline safety107—
even though drunk driving checkpoints and airport searches primarily

98. But see Maclin, supra note 24, at 294 (arguing that a passage in Maryland v. King
could be interpreted to mean that subsequent analysis of a legally obtained DNA sample
is indeed a search, but that under the conditions present in the case, it did not constitute
an unreasonable search).
99. 690 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2012).
100. Id. at 243–44.
101. Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753, 767 (Md. 2014). Like the United States Supreme
Court, the Maryland Supreme Court left open the possibility that obtaining the DNA for a
purpose other than identification could be an unreasonable search. Id. at 768.
102. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633–34 (1989).
103. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 347–48 (1985).
104. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566–67 (1976).
105. See Simmons, supra note 20, at 887–88.
106. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 464 U.S. 444, 449–52 (1990).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 911 (9th Cir. 1979), overruled on
other grounds by United States v. Aakai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
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exist to detect and deter criminal activity.108 But, however blurry the
line might be, the courts continue to rely on the purpose of the search
as a critical factor in determining whether the search is legal.109
This set of rules for the special needs doctrine is a version of the
“future use” rationale for use restrictions. It is not a true “future use”
rationale, since the police and prosecutors are still allowed to use the
results of the searches in criminal prosecutions, but it comes as close
as we have seen to an actual use restriction.
As with the Supreme Court’s treatment of DNA evidence in
King, the collection of the information is still the only “search” that
occurs, but the focus in evaluating the constitutionality of that search
has shifted from the mechanics of the search itself to what the
government plans to do with the information after it has been
collected. For example, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 110 the Court
invalidated a program in which a public hospital tested pregnant
women for drug use and then shared the positive results with law
enforcement.111 The Court held that the fact that the results were
turned over to the police “provided a basis for distinguishing our
prior cases applying the ‘special needs’ balancing approach to the
determination of drug use.”112 This doctrine was later applied to drug
testing in schools as well. In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 113
the Supreme Court approved a school’s random drug testing of
students participating in athletics, in part because of the limited ways
in which the results were used, noting that “the results of the tests
[were] disclosed only to a limited class of school personnel who ha[d]
a need to know; and they [were] not turned over to law enforcement
authorities or used for any internal disciplinary function.”114 Likewise,
in Board of Education. v. Earls,115 the Court approved of suspicionless
drug testing of students who were involved in competitive
extracurricular activities, pointing out that “the test results are not
turned over to any law enforcement authority,” and holding that
“[g]iven the minimally intrusive nature of the sample collection and

108. See Simmons, supra note 20, at 872–73.
109. Id. at 872–86.
110. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
111. Id. at 85–86.
112. Id. at 84; see also Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997) (striking down drug
testing for candidates for designated state offices). However, none of these cases actually
contains language that states that the ultimate use of the drug test results had any bearing
on the Court’s holding.
113. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
114. Id. at 658–60.
115. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
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the limited uses to which the test results are put, we conclude that the
invasion of the students’ privacy is not significant.”116
In addition, at least one special needs case has potentially
adopted the “processing data” rationale to support use restrictions. In
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association,117 the Court held
that mandatory drug tests for railway workers constituted a search.118
The Court noted that “analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal
a host of private medical facts about an employee, including whether
he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic. . . . [I]t is clear that the
collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy
that society has long recognized as reasonable.”119 Commentators
have cited Skinner as evidence that the Court recognizes that it is not
just the collection of data but also its subsequent use that could
constitute a search.120
Of course, this language from Skinner could be interpreted
another way: that the collection and testing together constitutes a
search—that is, it is the collection with the intent to test that makes
this action an unconstitutional search, not that the collection and the
testing are each independent searches. And in fact, future Supreme
Court cases lend support to this alternate interpretation. Skinner and
its companion case, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab,121 stand alone as the only Supreme Court cases to imply in any
way that the process of testing for drugs can itself can be a search.
And in the Ferguson case, Justice Scalia noted in his dissent that
under well-established law, neither the testing of the urine nor the
reporting of the results to the police could be considered a search.122
Unfortunately, the link to any kind of use restriction in special
needs cases gets even weaker outside of the drug testing context. In
116. Id. at 833–34.
117. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
118. Id. at 633–34; see also Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
678–79 (1989) (holding, on the same day Skinner was decided, that drug testing of United
States Customs Service employees was a search).
119. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (emphasis added).
120. See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 24, at 295–99.
121. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
122. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 92–93 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“What petitioners, the Court, and to a lesser extent the concurrence really object to is not
the urine testing, but the hospital’s reporting of positive drug-test results to police. But the
latter is obviously not a search. At most it may be a ‘derivative use of the product of a past
unlawful search,’ which, of course, ‘work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong’ and
‘presents a question, not of rights, but of remedies.’ United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 354 (1974). There is only one act that could conceivably be regarded as a search of
petitioners in the present case: the taking of the urine sample. . . . [I]t is not even arguable
that the testing of urine that has been lawfully obtained is a Fourth Amendment search.”).
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the significant (and growing) body of case law that makes up the
special needs jurisprudence, there are no other areas in which courts
attach any restrictions as to how the information is subsequently used
by the government, even though such a requirement would make
perfect sense in the special needs context. When the Court approved
drunk driving checkpoints in Michigan Department of State Police v.
Sitz,123 it did so knowing full well that the results of the breathalyzers
were being used in criminal prosecutions.124 Similarly, if TSA officials
recover a weapon or other contraband during an airport screening,
prosecutors are free to use that evidence in court.125 And if the police
officers pull over a car near the border with the purpose of detecting
illegal immigration, they are perfectly entitled to use any fruits of that
stop in a criminal case.126 Thus, the link between the special needs
cases and use restrictions is weaker than it first appears.
But if the Supreme Court were to adopt a robust exclusionary
rule for use restrictions on information gathered from surveillance,
the most logical place to start would be in the special needs context.
After all, the doctrinal basis of a special needs search is that the
search is undertaken for a non-law enforcement purpose. By applying
a robust “future use” doctrine and prohibiting the use of any fruits of
the search in a criminal case, the Court could guarantee that the
search was conducted for a non-law enforcement purpose.127 There
would be no need to try to determine the “primary purpose” of the
search, nor to worry about whether law enforcement is using the
special needs doctrine as a pretext to obtain evidence for a criminal
case. However, up until now, the Court has shown little appetite for
moving away from the traditional focus on the data collection as a
search, even in the special needs context.
This is somewhat surprising because use restrictions could be a
very useful tool for special needs cases. Not only would adopting use
restrictions ensure that the government could not abuse special needs
cases by using them as a pretext for a criminal investigation, it would

123. 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990).
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir.
1989) (stating in dicta that screeners in airports who find contraband while looking for
explosives or weapons are perfectly entitled to pass the information on to government
agents who would use it for general law enforcement purposes).
126. See generally Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149–50 (1925) (establishing
the right of police officers to search a car they have legally pulled over if they have
probable cause).
127. See Simmons, supra note 20, at 915–21.
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also broaden the type of special needs searches that law enforcement
could conduct.
For example, imagine a rule in which the government was not
allowed to use any fruits of a special needs search in a criminal
prosecution. The police could still conduct drunk driving stops, but
when they caught a drunk driver, they could not arrest or prosecute
him—they would merely seize him for a reasonable time to ensure
that he could not endanger others, perhaps until he sobered up or
until someone else could drive him to his destination. They could
impose civil punishment against him, such as seizing his car or
revoking his license, but they could not use any evidence from the
stop in a criminal case. This would still fulfill the stated purpose of the
drunk driving checkpoint—removing dangerous drivers from the
public roadways—and it would be consistent with the justification of
the special needs exception to the warrant requirement. The same
rule could apply to searches and drug tests of students in school:
students could be suspended or expelled, referred to counseling,
and/or barred from extracurricular activities, but they would not face
criminal charges based on anything the school recovered in the
search. Once again, this would fulfill the stated purpose of the
search— to maintain discipline on school grounds128—and ensure that
the search truly is being conducted for a “special need” beyond law
enforcement.129
Not only would use restrictions protect civil liberties by
preventing the abuse of the special needs doctrine as a pretext for a

128. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985).
129. I originally proposed applying this type of exclusionary rule-based use restriction
to all anti-terrorism special needs searches (such as searches at airports and subway stops)
as a way to balance the need for protection against cataclysmic attacks and need to protect
privacy rights. See Simmons, supra note 20, at 916–19. Professor Russell D. Covey
proposes a modified version of this use restriction: under his theory, the state could use
the fruits of a special needs search in criminal cases, but only to support criminal charges
that are related to the purpose of the special needs search. Thus, if police officers create a
special needs roadblock to check for drunk driving and uncover evidence of drunk driving,
they can use that evidence in a drunk driving prosecution. But if they found drugs or
illegal weapons in the car, they could not use that evidence in a future prosecution for
possession of that contraband. Likewise, if the police recovered a gun and drugs pursuant
to a special needs anti-terrorism search, they could use the gun in a prosecution for a
terrorism crime, but drugs would be precluded because they were not the original purpose
of the search. Covey, supra note 28, at 1308–12. Professor Covey correctly notes that this
proposal would prevent pretextual searches, and that it would be more politically
palatable than a blanket ban on using the obtained evidence in any future criminal
prosecution. Id. at 1309. However, this solution is not as doctrinally pure as a full ban on
any use of the evidence in any future criminal cases; the search will still not truly be a
“special needs” search if its results are used in criminal cases.
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law enforcement search, but use restrictions could also benefit law
enforcement by broadening the scope of the special needs exception.
In a sense, use restrictions could convert almost any type of
surveillance into a special needs search. For example, assume that
police in a major metropolitan area sought to reduce gun violence by
instituting an aggressive stop-and-frisk policy in the city. Police would
no longer need reasonable suspicion or even probable cause to
perform a stop-and-frisk; they would simply set up random
checkpoints at various spots in the city and perform a quick pat-down
of every fifth person who walked by. If an illegal gun (or any other
contraband) was found, it would be seized and destroyed, but it could
not be used in any criminal prosecution, and no criminal charges
would be filed against the suspect. This search regime is plainly not
created with a criminal law purpose, since none of the results are ever
used in a criminal proceeding—the only purpose behind the program
is to decrease gun violence in the city. As long as the stops are
reasonable in duration and the frisks are not unreasonably intrusive,
these searches should fit within the special needs doctrine.130 The
same argument could apply to a vast array of surveillance techniques,
particularly those meant to protect public safety. Truly intrusive
searches, such as home intrusions, wiretapping, or interception of
emails, would probably never be thought of as “reasonable” under
the special needs doctrine, thus placing a limit on the government’s
ability to invade our privacy.
The need to conduct special needs searches—and thus the need
to move towards a legitimate doctrinal justification for these
searches—will only increase as our society becomes more automated
and as an increasing number of industries require government
monitoring and regulation. The special needs doctrine was originally

130. Under the special needs doctrine, a search or a seizure is constitutional as long as
it is “reasonable.” See, e.g., MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 269 (2d. Cir. 2006) (“[O]nce
the government satisfies that threshold requirement [of an immediate purpose that is
distinct from investigating a crime] the court determines whether the search is reasonable
by balancing several competing considerations.”). There is some question as to whether a
routine suspicionless stop-and-frisk policy would be deemed “reasonable” as a special
needs search. Under Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), the suspicionless seizure of an
individual to ascertain the individual’s identity violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 52.
But recently courts have upheld suspicionless searches of individuals who boarded
subways or public buses based on the “special need” to prevent terrorism. See, e.g., AmArab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 04-11652-GAO, 2004
WL 1682859 at *4 (D. Mass. July 28, 2004) (searches of passengers on subways and
busses); Macwade, 460 F.3d at 275 (searches of subway passengers). The suspicionless
search and seizure might be considered more reasonable if the government were not
permitted to use the fruits of the search in a future criminal prosecution.
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born out of the need to permit government regulators the freedom to
conduct suspicionless and/or warrantless inspections131—indeed, no
regulatory state could function if the government were forced to
prove some level of individualized suspicion before conducting a
routine examination of a regulated entity. In the early days of the
special needs doctrine, the Supreme Court upheld suspicionless
searches by health inspectors,132 and inspectors of highly regulated
industries, such as sellers of firearms133 or mines.134 The administrative
state is growing faster than ever now, and the need to enforce those
regulations through government inspections is growing as well. At the
same time, new technologies are allowing the government to gather
ever increasing amounts of data in order to more efficiently and more
effectively regulate these industries.
Consider the example of self-driving cars. Under current
estimates, millions of fully autonomous vehicles will be on the
nation’s roads in the next ten or fifteen years.135 Government agencies
will want to regulate this new industry quite carefully, and one easy
way of obtaining the necessary data for that regulation would be to
require every autonomous vehicle to record its speed and location
and make that data available to the government at any time.136 Similar
recording and reporting requirements may be created for the flight
paths of privately owned drones. Indeed, local governments may need
to maintain a sophisticated, computerized air traffic control system in
order to keep track of their movements. This data would be necessary
for effective regulation, yet it would routinely give the government
extraordinary amounts of data about our locations and our activities.
Applying use restrictions to this data would ensure that this
information, which was gathered for a regulatory purpose, could only
be used for that regulatory purpose and could not be data mined for
evidence of criminal activity or even accessed by law enforcement
131. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967) (holding that no
individualized suspicion is required for a health inspector to obtain a warrant to enter a
home). Indeed, special needs searches were initially called “administrative searches,”
because they were thought to be a necessary aspect of the administrative state. See id. at
534. For a brief history of the origin of special needs searches, see Simmons, supra note 20,
at 855–59.
132. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534
133. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972).
134. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981).
135. See Alexander Hars, Forecasts, DRIVERLESS CAR MARKET WATCH,
http://www.driverless-future.com/?page_id=384 [https://perma.cc/8AF3-GEGA] (collecting
estimates from various sources).
136. Stephen P. Wood et al., The Potential Regulatory Challenges of Increasingly
Autonomous Motor Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1423, 1471–72 (2012).
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personnel when investigating a specific crime—unless, of course, the
law enforcement officer obtained a warrant authorizing that use.
D. National Security
One particularly distinctive type of special needs search is
government surveillance conducted for national security purposes. In
its simplest form, this includes physical searches meant to detect and
deter terrorist activity, such as searches of all airplane passengers or
everyone who enters a courthouse. As we saw in the previous Section,
these physical searches fit somewhat uncomfortably into the special
needs category because the supposed non-law enforcement need (to
ensure the safety of airline passengers) is difficult to distinguish from
a law enforcement need (to detect and apprehend violent criminals).
And yet to forbid law enforcement from conducting these searches,
which are perceived as being integral to the country’s terrorist
prevention programs, is a political non-starter. As noted above,137 use
restrictions on the fruits of these searches would be a potential
solution to this dilemma, though such restrictions might be difficult to
sell politically.138
The problem becomes even more complex when we examine
national security searches more broadly. Since the terrorist attacks of
2001, the federal government has aggressively expanded its national
security surveillance capabilities in dozens of different ways. The
NSA began issuing subpoenas to telecommunications companies to
collect telephony metadata on millions of Americans.139 The NSA
also launched the PRISM program, which collected all the digital
communications traveling across the Internet that matched specific
search terms.140 Meanwhile, government applications to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (the “FISA Court”) nearly tripled,

137. See supra Section II.C.
138. In practice, a use restriction for anti-terrorism searches would mean that when a
Transportation Security Administration officer recovered a gun or a bomb from an
individual trying to board a plane, the weapon could be seized, but criminal charges could
not be brought against the would-be hijacker. Civil penalties could be levied against the
individual, such as a fine or a five-year ban on travel, and the individual could be placed
on a surveillance watch list to be monitored for future criminal activity—but most people
would believe that not prosecuting such an individual is too high a price to pay for Fourth
Amendment purity. For further discussion of this problem, see infra Section III.D.
139. See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 796–97 (2d Cir. 2015).
140. See Charlie Savage, Edward Hyatt, & Peter Baker, U.S. Confirms That It Gathers
Online Data Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/us
/nsa-verizon-calls.html [https://perma.cc/F87T-HCSH (dark archive)].
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from an average of around 670 in the 1990s to an average of over
1,850 in the ten years after 2001.141
This expanded counter-terrorism program created a robust
debate in this country as to the appropriate balance between national
security and government surveillance. Government officials defend
these measures as critical to keeping the country safe,142 while groups
such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic
Privacy Information Center attack the measures as incompatible with
a democratic society.143 This is, of course, the latest incarnation of the
age-old tension between liberty and security.
One possible solution to this conflict would be to regulate
national security surveillance at the use stage rather than the
acquisition stage. Professor Kerr has argued that the combination of
sophisticated data processing systems and the increased threat of
terrorism leads to the conclusion that “[t]he best way to achieve the
benefits of computer surveillance while minimizing the privacy risks is
to place greater focus on the later regulatory stages, and in particular,
the final stage of public disclosure.”144 This is an example of the
“ongoing seizure” method of use restrictions, in which courts initially
authorize an overly broad seizure, and then impose restrictions on
which bits of information the government is allowed to use out of the
vast amount data that it seized.145 This Article discusses another

141. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court Orders, 1979–2016, ELEC. PRIVACY
INFO. CTR., https://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html [https://perma.cc/Z398G2TH].
142. Once the scope of the surveillance program came to light, the Director of National
Intelligence, James Clapper, defended its existence, arguing that the “[i]nformation
collected under this program is among the most important and valuable intelligence
information we collect, and is used to protect our nation from a wide variety of threats.”
See Savage et al., supra note 140.
143. See, e.g., ACLU v. NSA – Challenge to Warrantless Wiretapping, ACLU (Sept. 10,
2014), https://www.aclu.org/cases/aclu-v-nsa-challenge-warrantless-wiretapping [https://perma.cc
/2AHU-Z79V] (detailing the ACLU court battle against the NSA’s “warrantless
wiretaps”); EPIC Files Supreme Court Petition, Challenges Domestic Surveillance
Program, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/2013/07/epic-files-supreme-courtpetit.html [https://perma.cc/3VF9-ABSD] (describing EPIC’s court battle with the NSA
over the same issue).
144. See Kerr, supra note 8, at 8.
145. Professor Kerr argues that there are four stages of computer-based surveillance:
(1) data collection, (2) data manipulation by a machine, (3) human disclosure, and (4)
public disclosure. Rather than define the processing of the information as a “search” (as
many would argue is appropriate in the DNA testing context, or in other “mosaic theory”
contexts), Professor Kerr would draw the line at his third stage—when the computer
discloses the information to a human being. Id. at 4–6.
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example of this method of use restriction in the upcoming Section on
warrants for searches of digital storage devices.146
In reality, use restrictions are the primary way in which
telephony metadata has been regulated. Before 2015, the NSA was
given relatively free reign to collect and maintain vast domestic
telephony databases, and the courts allowed the government to access
these databases (after obtaining a court order) whenever necessary to
investigate a person of interest.147 In a sense, this was an area that was
governed solely by use restrictions. The government collected
millions of pieces of data and stored them for future use, and when it
needed to look at the data, it would apply for a “pen/trap order”148 to
allow it to trace the details of a specific phone number.149 As one
United States official explained, “The basic idea is that it’s O.K. to
create this huge pond of data, but you have to establish a reason to
stick your pole in the water and start fishing.”150 The problem that
most commentators had with the ongoing seizure use restriction in
this context was that the use restriction was not very robust, since the
standard for obtaining a pen/trap order is very low.151 But in theory,
either courts or the legislature could create higher standards before
allowing law enforcement officers to “start fishing” in the data pond.
The other type of use restriction that, at least in theory, could be
used in the national security context is the “sequester” method. Given
the fact that counterterrorism and intelligence gathering are
traditionally carried out by different agencies, courts or the legislature
could create a firewall between agencies, allowing agencies like the
NSA or the CIA relatively free reign to collect telephony metadata or
monitor internet traffic, but tightly regulating the conditions under
which those agencies are allowed to share their information with the

146. See infra Section II.E.
147. This bulk collection of metadata was authorized by the USA PATRIOT Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287–88 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1861–62 (2012)). Congress ended the NSA’s authority to conduct these massive
collections in the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 101(a)(3)(C)(ii),
129 Stat. 268, 269–70 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2) (2015)).
148. A “pen/trap order” allows the police to obtain the telephone number that was
dialed by the suspect.
149. See Stephen E. Henderson, Fourth Amendment Time Machines (And What They
Might Say About Police Body Cameras), 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 933, 941 (2016).
150. See Eric Lichtblau, In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers of N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES
(July 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/us/in-secret-court-vastly-broadenspowers-of-nsa.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/VC9Y-AXNG (dark archive)].
151. The Pen/Trap statute requires merely that officers certify that “the information
likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3122(b)(2) (2012).

96 N.C. L. REV. 133 (2017)

2017]

USE RESTRICTIONS

165

FBI or the Department of Justice. As we will see below,152 the FISA
statute establishes a weak form of sequestration by placing some
restrictions on how the national security agencies can share
information with law enforcement agencies.
E.

Digital Searches

Use restrictions have also been proposed and utilized by courts
in a very different context: to ensure that law enforcement officers do
not gain access to too much information when they conduct searches
of digital devices pursuant to a warrant.153 Unlike the mosaic theory’s
warrantless bulk surveillances that gather millions of data points
about thousands of people, searches of digital devices are smaller in
scale, tied to a specific individual, and supported by a warrant.
There is a growing consensus that searches of digital media raise
unique problems that are not sufficiently addressed by traditional
Fourth Amendment doctrine. The basic problem is that neither
physical boundaries nor the particularity requirement create sufficient
limitations on the extent of a digital search. Digital devices can store
vast amounts of information, much of it quite personal. As the
Supreme Court noted in Riley v. California,154 cell phones “hold for
many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’”155 This is true for laptop
computers, tablets, and many other personal devices that store
gigabytes of data. Thus, a warrant that allows law enforcement
officers to search through a computer is the equivalent of allowing
law enforcement officers to search through hundreds of file cabinets
(or even warehouses) of an individual’s private information. But most
of the traditional legal and physical limitations that apply to
traditional searches do not exist for digital searches. In a traditional
search, law enforcement officers may only look in places where the
item they are searching for could be hidden; thus, if they are
searching for a handgun, they cannot look in places that are too small
to hold a handgun.156 In a digital search, if police are looking for a
document or picture or any piece of data, they are allowed to look
anywhere on the digital device to find it.157
152. See infra text accompanying note 243.
153. See, e.g., United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 133–41 (2d Cir. 2014), aff’d en
banc, 824 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2016).
154. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
155. Id. at 2494–95 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
156. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820–21 (1982) (“A lawful search of fixed
premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be
found . . . .”).
157. See Kerr, supra note 9, at 9.
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In practice, this means that if the police obtain a warrant to
search a suspect’s computer for documents relating to a suspected tax
fraud, the police could look through every bit of data on the suspect’s
computer. In theory, the particularity requirement could require a
warrant which specifies either the type of document that can be seized
or a date range during which the target documents may have been
written, but in practice individuals can easily alter the metadata on
any incriminating files so that a document may appear to be of a
different type or created on a different date.158 Acknowledging this
reality, Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure creates a
two-step process for seizing electronic media, stating that a warrant
may permit the government to seize the entire storage medium and
then later review the seized material to determine which of it is
actually responsive to the warrant.159 In other words, “over-seizing is
an inherent part of the electronic search process” as government
necessarily seizes “a larger pool of data that it has no probable cause
to collect.”160
There are a number of different ways to solve this “over-seizing”
problem. The first is to abolish or limit the plain view exception for
digital searches. Under the plain view doctrine, the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from observing (or
seizing) any item or information that is in plain view, as long as the
officer has a right to be in a certain location.161 In order to solve the
problem this doctrine creates for digital searches, courts could create
a “digital evidence” exception to the plain view doctrine and hold that
if law enforcement officers find incriminating evidence in the digital
device that is not listed in the warrant, the incriminating evidence is
inadmissible in a criminal proceeding.162 This would eliminate any

158. See id. at 8–11.
159. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(B).
160. United States v. Schesso, 730 F.3d 1040, 1042 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing United States
v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1177 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per
curiam)).
161. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (per curiam).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d 989, 1006 (9th
Cir. 2009) (en banc) (suggesting that magistrate judges should require the government to
waive the plain view exception in digital searches); United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268,
1276 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that any incriminating evidence that is found pursuant to a
digital search which was not the subject of the warrant is inadmissible unless the discovery
was “inadvertent”); see also Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119
HARV. L. REV. 531, 576–84 (2005) (arguing in favor of narrowing or eliminating the plain
view exception for digital searches). Professor Kerr has recently abandoned this proposal
in favor of a more narrowly tailored use restriction for digital searches. See Kerr, supra
note 9, at 18–24.
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incentive for police to obtain digital warrants on pretextual grounds
and would likely lead to more narrowly tailored digital searches.
However, such a change would entail a significant restructuring of
Fourth Amendment doctrine as the plain view doctrine is a longstanding legal principle.163 Furthermore, carving out an exception to
the plain view doctrine would also not prevent the government from
over-seizing the data, since the government would still copy and
retain the entire hard drive for a potential search at a later time.164
Thus, the government would still possess and see far more
information than authorized in the warrant; it would simply be
restricted as to how much of the information it could use in court
against the defendant in a specific case.
Another possibility would be for a court issuing a warrant to
place restrictions on how the warrant is executed, in order to ensure
that the law enforcement officers never see any information not
authorized in the warrant. The Ninth Circuit approved of such a
procedure in the en banc decision United States v. Comprehensive
Drug Testing.165 In that case, the government sought a warrant to
obtain the drug testing results of a few specific individuals in a
company’s database.166 The issuing magistrate granted the warrant,
but mandated specific search protocols, including the requirement
that an independent group of forensic experts had to conduct the
search and segregate the information specified in the warrant before
handing it over to the investigating officers.167 This is a modified
version of the “sequester” rationale, since it works by keeping certain
data out of the hands of law enforcement entirely. Although this
solution is cumbersome, it nevertheless prevents law enforcement
officers from accessing or obtaining any data that is not the subject of
the warrant. The resulting search maximizes privacy rights. The
disadvantage of such a solution is that it tends to balkanize criminal
procedure rules regarding digital searches. Instead of appellate courts
laying down broadly applicable rules regarding the types of searches
that are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, appellate courts

163. Harris, 390 U.S. at 236 (“It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain
view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be introduced in evidence.”).
164. Id. at 14–17.
165. 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
166. Id. at 993–94.
167. Id. at 996.
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would merely review whether each individual magistrate’s search
protocol was followed.168
A third solution would be to apply the ongoing seizure rationale
to justify the exclusion of certain evidence.169 In other words, when
law enforcement seizes information from a digital device and holds
the information, the continued possession of that information is an
ongoing seizure, and the moment that law enforcement uses the
information for a different investigation, that seizure becomes
unreasonable.170 Thus, the government should only be able to use the
previously-seized information if the use is consistent with the original
warrant.171 As Professor Stephen Henderson noted: “[i]t is a serious
invasion if the government can over-seize massive amounts of private
information and forever retain it for indefinite later search.”172
Use restrictions are easier to defend in the context of digital
searches because the particularity requirement inherent in a search
warrant essentially creates a sound doctrinal basis for restricting the
data that the government is allowed to use, and thus imposing a use
restriction does not require any fundamental re-working of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.173
The Second Circuit imposed just such a use restriction in the case
of United States v. Ganias,174 in which law enforcement officers
obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s computers for evidence
that his clients were overcharging the army for services.175 Pursuant to
standard procedure, the officers made “mirror images” of all of the
defendant’s hard drives, which copied every single piece of data on
the computers.176 At the time of the search, the officers told the
defendant that the government was only looking for evidence of the
overcharging and that everything else would be deleted once the
relevant files were recovered.177 However, once the agents obtained
168. Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure, 96 VA. L. REV.
1241, 1278 (2010).
169. See supra Section I.A.1.
170. See Kerr, supra note 9, at 18.
171. A modified version of the ongoing seizure rationale would allow the government
to use the seized information if there was a national security concern or other exigent
circumstances. See Henderson, supra note 149, at 948.
172. Id. at 947.
173. This type of use restriction would require a minor change in Fourth Amendment
doctrine: recognizing the concept of an “ongoing seizure” to apply to a situation in which
the government retains information that they legally obtained in a search.
174. 755 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014).
175. Id. at 128.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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the files that were listed in the warrant, they kept the full copies of the
hard drives for the next two and a half years.178 During that time the
law enforcement agents developed probable cause to believe that the
defendant was involved in under-reporting his client’s income, and
they obtained a warrant to search the stored hard drive for evidence
of this new crime.179 By that time, the defendant had altered the data
on his own computer, so the only evidence of the crime was the copies
of the data that the government had preserved.180
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that law enforcement officers
violated the defendant’s rights when they used the retained computer
data for a purpose that went beyond that which was authorized by the
original warrant.181 The court held that the initial overly broad seizure
was necessary to execute the first warrant, but that once the
“responsive” files were recovered, the “non-responsive” files should
have been deleted.182 The court thus imposed a use restriction on the
data recovered in the initial seizure—although all the data was legally
seized, only the responsive data could be used.183
A similar problem, and a similar solution, arises in investigations
that use cell-site simulators to collect a suspect’s cell phone number.
A cell-site simulator, otherwise known as a “stingray,” fools all the
cell phones in the immediate area into thinking it is a cell phone
tower, and thereby collects identifying information from all of the
nearby cell phones.184 Law enforcement officers use these devices to
learn the cell phone number of a specific suspect: they will see the
suspect in a public place, activate the stingray, and obtain a list of the

178. Id. at 129–30.
179. Id. at 130.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 137–39.
182. Id. at 139 (conceding that the government may need to keep the entire mirrored
copy of the hard drive in order to properly authenticate the responsive files, but that this
was the only proper use of the non-responsive files).
183. Id. at 140. Many courts have held that an initial “overbroad” seizure is reasonable
given the nature of electronic records. See United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 652 (6th
Cir. 2012); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 334–35 (6th Cir. 2001); In re the Search of Info.
Associated with the Facebook Account Identified by the Username Aaron.Alexis that is
Stored at Premises Controlled by Facebook, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2013)
(justifying the issuing of “secondary orders” when granting warrants to search electronic
media, requiring that non-responsive contents must be returned or destroyed); United
States v. Winther, Criminal No. 11-212, 2011 WL 5837083, at *11–12 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18,
2011).
184. ADAM BATES, CATO INST., STINGRAY: A NEW FRONTIER IN POLICE
SURVEILLANCE 4–5 (Cato Inst., Policy Analysis No. 809, 2017), https://object.cato.org
/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-809-revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9MW-SASG].
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telephone numbers of all of the cell phones in the area.185 They will
then follow the suspect to another location, re-activate the stingray,
and get another list of the nearby cell phones.186 After repeating this
process a few times, the agents can isolate the suspect’s phone
number as the only number that is consistently present at each
location. The agents then obtain a pen/trap order or a wiretap order
for the defendant’s phone and continue their investigation.187 But in
the meantime, the law enforcement officers have collected dozens or
hundreds of phone numbers from innocent civilians who happened to
be in the area when the stingray was activated.
Like the overbroad hard drive seizure in Ganias, the overbroad
seizure of hundreds of phone numbers of innocent people is a
necessary component of this investigative technique. One response to
this problem would be to simply ban the technique altogether—the
seizure of so much information is not worth the benefit to law
enforcement. But a more nuanced approach would be to impose a use
restriction on the information that is recovered. For example, only the
suspect’s cell phone number (once identified) can be used, and all the
other cell phone numbers must be permanently deleted. This was the
approach of a district court judge in a recent case. The judge
authorized the use of the stingray only if the government agreed not
to use the “innocent” phone numbers for any purpose, explaining that
“[m]inimizing procedures such as the destruction of private
information the United States has no right to keep are necessary to
protect the goals of the Fourth Amendment.”188
F.

Drones and Police Body Cameras

The growing use of surveillance drones by law enforcement
brings up another type of challenge to Fourth Amendment doctrine.
Drones are a specific example of the new technologies that law
enforcement officers can use as a force multiplier, allowing one
officer to conduct the same amount of surveillance that would have
required five, ten, or even more officers in the past.189 Drones are
185. Id. at 5.
186. Id.
187. Presumably the law enforcement officers already have the appropriate level of
suspicion with regard to the defendant to justify their application for a pen/trap or a
wiretap.
188. See In re the Application of the U.S. for an Order Relating to Tels. Used by
Suppressed, No. 15 M 0021, 2015 WL 6871289 at *10 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2015).
189. Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment
Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 527, 606
(2017).
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used to patrol the international border,190 monitor traffic patterns,191
take photos of crime scenes,192 search for missing persons,193 and even
to watch for escaping defendants during police raids.194 So far, their
use in active criminal investigations has been rare,195 but their
potential application in crime detection as mobile surveillance devices
is obvious. Not only can drones carry powerful cameras that can view
activity from a significant distance, they can also be equipped with
high-resolution microphones or even stingrays that intercept cell
phone metadata or content.196 Some of these surveillance options,
such as thermal imagers that monitor private residences, would
constitute a search at the collection stage,197 but others, such as
cameras in public places,198 do not implicate the Fourth Amendment.
Like the GPS tracking at issue in Jones or the private closedcircuit television cameras present in innumerable public places,199
widespread law enforcement use of surveillance drones could provide

190. Paul McBride, Beyond Orwell: The Application of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in
Domestic Surveillance Operations, 74 J. AIR L. & COM. 627, 635 (2009) (describing a
Predator drone that flew along the United States-Mexico border and helped to capture
over 2,000 undocumented aliens and over 8,000 pounds of marijuana over a seven-month
period); but see Craig Whitlock, U.S. Surveillance Drones Largely Ineffective Along
Border, Report Says, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world
/national-security/us-surveillance-drones-largely-ineffective-along-border-report-says/2015
/01/06/5243abea-95bc-11e4-aabd-d0b93ff613d5_story.html [https://perma.cc/X8ZV-GEU7]
(reporting that less than two percent of the nearly 121,000 illegal border crossers were
apprehended with the help of drones).
191. See Morrison, supra note 27, at 753.
192. Chris Francecsani, Domestic Drones are Already Reshaping U.S. Crime-Fighting,
REUTERS (Mar. 3, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/03/us-usa-droneslawenforcement-idUSBRE92208W20130303 [https://perma.cc/PY6L-98VZ] (describing a
deputy sheriff who uses a drone to take photographs at crime scenes from multiple
altitudes, in order to “bring the crime scene right into the jury box”).
193. Id. (describing a private drone pilot who worked with police and helped to locate
ten missing persons during search and rescue operations).
194. Jason Koebler, Court Upholds Domestic Drone Use in Arrest of American Citizen,
U.S. NEWS (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/08/02/court-upholdsdomestic-drone-use-in-arrest-of-american-citizen [https://perma.cc/VZD3-W3JA].
195. Morrison, supra note 27, at 753–54.
196. Id. at 752–53.
197. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
198. United States v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282, 287–90 (6th Cir. 2016). Indeed, even ten
weeks’ worth of camera surveillance of a suspect’s front was not considered a “search” by
the Sixth Circuit.
199. There are an estimated thirty million surveillance cameras in the United States,
though this number includes private and public surveillance cameras. Suzanne Choney,
Lawmakers Want More Surveillance on the Ground—and in the Sky, NBC NEWS (Apr. 20,
2013), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/20/17830619-lawmakers-want-moresurveillance-on-the-ground-and-in-the-sky?lite [https://perma.cc/KL3C-RDBH].
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enormous gains for deterring and investigating criminal activity.200 It
could also provide the government with enormous amounts of
information about individuals without the need to prove any
individualized suspicion. One possible way to avoid these privacy
intrusions would be to restrict the ways in which law enforcement
officers can use drones to collect information. For example, a
legislature could pass a law stating that the police can only use a
drone for a criminal investigation if the police had reasonable
suspicion or probable cause. Such a limitation could come directly
from the courts as well, but as with the mosaic theory, this would
require a significant restructuring of Fourth Amendment doctrine
regarding reasonable expectations of privacy in public places.
So far states and the federal government have been reluctant to
place limitations on law enforcement use of drones,201 perhaps
because legislatures are concerned about denying the police access to
this powerful new tool in a time when there is increased worry about
terrorist activity.202 Once again, use restrictions on the data could be a
solution to this problem. Law enforcement drones could be allowed
to surveil public places by the thousands, recording and storing huge
amounts of information, but police could only access the information
upon a showing of probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or at least a
demonstration that the information is likely relevant to an ongoing
criminal investigation.203 To take an obvious example, if a crime
occurs in public at a certain time and a certain place, law enforcement
officers would be authorized to access the databank of drone records
200. Studies have shown that installing CCTV cameras leads to a significant decrease
in crime, especially when the cameras are installed in parking lots and public
transportation. Brandon C. Welsh & David P. Farrington, Public Area CCTV and Crime
Prevention: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 26 JUST. Q. 716, 732–33
(2009).
201. In contrast, many states have passed laws limiting the private use of drones for
data collection. For an overview of state laws in the civil privacy context, see Margot E.
Kaminski, Regulating Real-World Surveillance, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1113, 1158–62 (2015).
For example, Texas has passed a law banning the use of drones to capture images with the
“intent to conduct surveillance.” Id. at 1159; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.003 (West,
Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
202. For example, public surveillance cameras were instrumental in tracking down and
identifying the Boston Marathon bombers. Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Fourth Amendment
Future of Public Surveillance: Remote Recording and Other Searches in Public Space, 63
AM. U. L. REV. 21, 23 (2013). Drones could be even more useful than stationary cameras
in many such situations.
203. This last phrase mirrors the language in the Pen/Trap statute, which law
enforcement officers must comply with when they seek to obtain non-content information
about a communication. The Pen/Trap statute requires that officers certify that “the
information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation . . . .” 18
U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2) (2012).
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to see whether a drone had observed and recorded any aspect of the
crime with these time and place restrictions as limitations. As another
example, once a person becomes suspected of a crime, police officers
would be authorized to use their drone database to review that
person’s movements over the past few weeks and perhaps dedicate a
drone to their movements in the near future. This would be another
example of the “ongoing seizure” type of use restriction.
Professor Stephen Henderson proposes a similar use restriction
regime in the context of police body cameras.204 Calling police body
cameras “government time machines,” Professor Henderson argues
that recording everything that every police officer sees promises
significant benefits, such as preserving evidence that might otherwise
be lost, mischaracterized, or forgotten by the witnesses,205 as well as
deterring and exposing improper police conduct.206 But since these
body cameras also record a large amount of innocent, private activity,
Professor Henderson proposes use restrictions on the video that is
recorded, including “security from unauthorized access, need-toknow limitations, audit logs, and destruction schedules.”207 These
restrictions could come from police administrative rules, legislative
action, or even by an aggressive interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment. As Professor Henderson argues, “[r]eturning to the
home after completion of the search would of course require a new
warrant,” so reviewing and perhaps even enhancing a video recording
of the initial search of the home should also be viewed as its own
separate search.208
Professor Henderson acknowledges the limits of use restrictions;
indeed, he argues that use restrictions should usually only be used to
supplement more traditional restrictions on “front-end” data

204.
205.
206.
207.

See Henderson, supra note 149, at 960–71.
Id. at 966–68.
Id. at 968–70.
Id. at 970.

[G]iven the myriad benefits of tamper-resistant, always-on officer recording, it
seems such recording is worth the privacy cost. But this merely means police
should record. It remains to be determined—or should remain to be determined—
what can be done with those recordings . . . . Thus, as an administrative matter in
police department guidelines, as a legislative matter, and—I would argue—as a
matter of Fourth Amendment (and state constitutional analog) reasonableness,
there should be use and disclosure limitations on that data.
Id.
208. Id. at 970–71.
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collection.209 But in the case of police body cameras, he notes that
they would only record views that an officer is lawfully entitled to see;
thus, body camera images are already subject to a “built-in” front-end
data collection restriction.210
The analogy between police body cameras and drones is not a
perfect one. While it is true that in both cases the law enforcement
action is subject to some level of front-end collection restriction, the
rules regarding what a police officer can do (and where she can go)
during a criminal investigation are detailed and well established. In
contrast, the only rules regarding what a drone can do and where it
can go is the public place/private place distinction, and even that
distinction provides scant protection in light of the “flyover” cases
that allow law enforcement officers in planes and helicopters to
observe even the curtilage of a home.211 Furthermore, police body
cameras do no more than record what a human police officer is
already seeing; thus, they do not gather any more information than
the officer does with his own eyes. Drones, on the other hand, can
allow the police to increase their surveillance power a hundredfold or
more at far less cost.212 Thus, the historic economic check on
government surveillance is much less effective.213
But the analogy remains useful. Both drones and police body
cameras represent technologies that allow for significant increase in
detecting and deterring crime, and this increase rises exponentially if
the data collection restrictions are kept to a minimum. If drones are
only allowed to operate after reasonable suspicion or probable cause
has been established, they will be unable to deter and detect
unforeseen criminal activity. Police body cameras that can only gather
data at the discretion of the police officer or the suspect will likewise
fail to provide a useful record of either police abuse or potential
criminal activity.214 Thus, the best solution in both situations could be
209. Id. at 962. Professor Henderson has his own significant critiques of use
restrictions, which is discussed in Part V.
210. Id. at 963.
211. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212–15 (1986).
212. See Levinson-Waldman, supra note 189, at 606.
213. Judges have been wary of surveillance technology that allows law enforcement to
leverage its surveillance power. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 418–31
(2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that courts must step in to protect the public from
continuous GPS surveillance because the traditional practical limits on surveillance no
longer applied). I have critiqued this point of view as overly simplistic. See Ric Simmons,
Ending the Zero-Sum Game: How to Increase the Productivity of the Fourth Amendment,
36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 550, 557–79 (2013).
214. Professor Henderson acknowledges this as well, noting that “there might be
circumstances when it is impossible to get the desired law enforcement safety benefit
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to allow for relatively unlimited data collection,215 but to merely
record and store the data unless and until the government can show a
specific need for it.
G. Creating Binary Searches
A “binary search” is a search that only reveals the presence or
absence of illegal activity, such as a field test for narcotics or a drugsniffing dog. The Supreme Court has held that this type of
surveillance is not a Fourth Amendment search, since it only reveals
private information to the police if illegal activity is occurring, and
individuals have no legitimate expectation of privacy in illegal
activity.216 In one sense, the binary search doctrine is merely a type of
use restriction, since it states that if a certain kind of data can only be
used to prove criminal activity, then collecting that data is not a
Fourth Amendment search.
By the same token, use restrictions can theoretically be used to
turn many types of surveillance into a binary search. Machines could
gather information about a suspect, but not share this information
with any human being. Software would then process this information
into a binary result: either there is probable cause to believe the
suspect has committed a crime, or there is not. If there is no probable
cause of criminal activity, the data would never be shared with
anyone, and (theoretically) the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights
would not have been implicated.217 If there is probable cause of
criminal activity, the machine would notify the law enforcement
officer, and the officer would obtain a warrant to access the data. This
is an example of the “future use” version of use restrictions, since it is
the future use of the data that determines whether collecting the data
itself is constitutional—if the data is only “seen” by machines, then
the Fourth Amendment does not apply.218
without completely abandoning front-end acquisition restraints, as with broad scale,
panvasive drone surveillance, or with broad scale, panvasive Internet surveillance for
malware.” Henderson, supra note 149, at 960. This Article discusses the application of use
restrictions for Internet surveillance in Section III.A.1.
215. Unlimited, that is, within the contours of existing Fourth Amendment and
legislative rules.
216. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (stating in dicta that using a
drug-trained dog is not a “search” because it can only reveal information of illegal activity,
in which the defendant has no legitimate expectation of privacy); see also Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2005) (same).
217. See Covey, supra note 28, at 1312–16.
218. Orin Kerr has a somewhat different interpretation of binary searches, or at least
of the field test that the Court approved of in United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109
(1984). He applies “ongoing seizure” doctrine to that case, noting that in Jacobsen the
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These technology-based binary searches could take many forms.
Companies have already developed portable “gun detectors” that
measure the radiation emitted by a person’s body and can tell
whether the radiation is being blocked by a firearm.219 If the law
enforcement officer using the gun detector sees an actual image of all
the items being carried by an individual, using the device would likely
be a search under the Fourth Amendment since it would be revealing
information in which the suspect has a reasonable explanation of
privacy.220 But assume the device does not display any images to its
user. Instead, the device uses software to examine the image and
determine whether one of the items carried by the suspect was a gun,
and if it determines that a gun was present, it would emit a noise or
cause a light to flash. If the device were used in a context in which it
was illegal to carry a firearm,221 this process would transform a Fourth
Amendment search into a binary search since the law enforcement

agents lawfully seized the defendant’s package of cocaine, and then destroyed a trace
amount of that substance when they conducted a field test. Kerr, supra note 9, at 20–24
(citing Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 111–12). The Court noted in dicta that if the government had
destroyed a large portion of the substance in their field test, the intrusion into the suspect’s
privacy interests would have been greater and thus the seizure may have been
unreasonable. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 125. Kerr used this dicta as evidence that government
actions after a seizure has been made can transform a reasonable, constitutional search
into an unreasonable, and thus unconstitutional, search. Kerr, supra note 9, at 20–24. This
application of Jacobsen provides only weak support for the adoption of use restrictions
because it requires us to view the government actions in Jacobsen as one ongoing seizure
which could be made illegal at any point if the government “misuses” the item that is
seized. It makes more sense, however, to view Jacobsen as two distinct seizures—first, the
package is seized (which is reasonable for a short period of time) and second, a portion of
the substance is destroyed in the test (which is reasonable if the size of the portion is de
minimis). If the second seizure is unreasonable because too much of the substance is
destroyed, that makes the second seizure illegal, but it does not mean that the first seizure
now also becomes illegal—unless you choose (as Kerr does) to conflate the government
actions into one ongoing seizure.
219. See, e.g., John Rudolph, NYPD Testing Long-Distance Gun Detection Device,
HUFFPOST (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/18/nypd-gun-detectiondevice_n_1213813.html [https://perma.cc/JNV3-9R4T].
220. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that the government’s
use of a thermal imaging-device to detect the heat emerging from inside a house was a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment).
221. For example, in a jurisdiction where concealed carry is not permitted, or in a
jurisdiction which allows for concealed carry, but requires any individual who interacts
with a police officer to inform him or her that she is carrying a firearm. See, e.g., OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.126(A) (West, Westlaw through 2017 File 23 of 132d Gen.
Assemb. (2017–2018) & 2017 State Issue 1) (“If a licensee is stopped for a law
enforcement purpose and if the licensee is carrying a concealed handgun at the time the
officer approaches, the licensee shall promptly inform any law enforcement officer who
approaches the licensee while stopped that the licensee has been issued a concealed
handgun license and that the licensee currently is carrying a concealed handgun . . . .”).
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officer using the device would learn nothing private about the suspect
unless the suspect were carrying an illegal item.
Similarly, if the government installed software on internet service
providers to monitor the internet traffic passing from one computer
to another and sent all of the information to be reviewed by a law
enforcement officer, courts would almost certainly consider that to be
a search under the Fourth Amendment.222 But if the government
instead installed a more sophisticated piece of software that
autonomously analyzed each piece of data flowing past and only
notified law enforcement if a known piece of child pornography was
in transit, the government agents would learn nothing about the
suspects’ data unless the suspect was engaged in criminal activity.223 In
each of these examples, the government is collecting the data, but the
collection is not deemed a search because of the way the data is used
after it is collected: it is only given to machines to process, not to
human beings.224
H. Solving the Encryption Dilemma
Law enforcement officers are facing a serious and growing
problem with the ever-increasing sophistication of encryption
222. There is an argument that under the third-party doctrine, such monitoring would
not be a “search” because every individual who uses an internet service provider is
knowingly sharing all of the information with a third party. See, e.g., United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440–43 (1976) (holding that a bank depositor does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in any information he has knowingly turned over to his
bank). This argument is not likely to survive in the current digital age. See, e.g., United
States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285–88 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the emails that are sent through a third-party internet
service provider).
223. For a more detailed discussion of these advanced types of binary searches, see Ric
Simmons, The Two Unanswered Questions of Illinois v. Caballes: How to Make the World
Safe for Binary Searches, 80 TUL. L. REV. 411 (2005).
224. This use of the binary search doctrine could be combined with the mosaic theory
discussed earlier. See supra Section II.A. It is certainly possible that the government could
develop algorithms sophisticated enough to determine probable cause of illegal activity
from dozens or even hundreds of seemingly innocuous facts about a subject. Thus, even if
courts adopt a “data processing” type of use restriction and determine that the processing
of massive amounts of public data could be considered a search, courts could also then
apply a “future use” type of use restriction and determine that the processing is not a
search if the mechanical processor does not turn the results over to human law
enforcement officers unless there is clear evidence of criminal activity. This would require
a very sophisticated algorithm, one that is capable of not only determining the likelihood
of criminal activity, but also determining whether that likelihood rises to the level of
probable cause. In the context of detecting hidden guns or digital files of child
pornography, it is pretty clear when criminal activity is present; in the context of the
massive amounts of information processed under a mosaic theory doctrine, the
determination will be much more difficult.
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technology. As digital devices become more secure, law enforcement
officers are occasionally unable to access the information on those
devices, even if they are legally entitled to do so by a valid court
order. In two recent cases,225 the FBI sought to force Apple to decrypt
information on devices that the company had built. In each case, the
FBI had the right to the information under the Fourth Amendment,
but was initially unable to access the information due to the strength
of the encryption.226
This tension between the need to have secure devices and the
need for law enforcement to gain access when they are legally
authorized to do so is only going to increase as hyper-encrypted
devices become more and more common. In order to ensure that the
government is able to access these devices when they have a court
order, law enforcement officers are asking Congress to pass
legislation requiring manufacturers to build “backdoors” into all of
their encryption software.227 For example, Congress could require all
manufacturers of encrypted devices to provide a key to their
encryption and place that key in escrow, available to the government
only if the appropriate legal standards are met.228 Under this model,
the government will collect and hold the keys to millions of digital
devices, but will be forbidden from using any key unless it obtained a
court order.229 This could be seen as a “data processing” form of use
restriction—the actual search occurs not when the government
automatically collects all of the passwords, but when it uses the
passwords to process the encrypted material and extract the
information. However, this solution would give law enforcement the
power to break into any encrypted software, a power that would be
limited only by the legal restrictions created by the courts and the

225. See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 345 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); In re the Search of
an Apple Iphone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus
IS300, Cal. License Plate 35KGD203, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 WL 618401, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 16, 2016).
226. 149 F. Supp. 3d at 345; 2016 WL 618401, at *1.
227. Spencer Ackerman, FBI Chief Wants “Backdoor Access” to Encrypted
Communications to Fight ISIS,” GUARDIAN (July 8, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2015/jul/08/fbi-chief-backdoor-access-encryption-isis [https://perma.cc/5NCWHXHG].
228. This idea has been floated before in a different context, when some members of
Congress proposed that all telephones and computers had to be equipped with a “Clipper
Chip,” which would provide the users with the highest level of encryption technology, but
would give the government backdoor decryption keys. See A. Michael Froomkin, The
Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 709, 743, 752, 755–57 (1995).
229. See id.
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legislatures. As noted below,230 it may be unwise to give that much
information access to law enforcement officials.
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST USE RESTRICTIONS
As we have seen, use restrictions offer potential solutions to
some of the more difficult Fourth Amendment problems that courts
are facing today. However, these solutions come with doctrinal
challenges and strong policy implications.
A. Doctrinal and Political Obstacles
As noted in Part I, there are three ways that use restrictions can
be given legal authority: appellate courts could adopt use restrictions
as one of the factors in deciding whether government surveillance
violates the Fourth Amendment; magistrates and lower court judges
could write use restrictions into their search warrants; and/or
legislatures could create use restrictions through statute. However,
the first and third method face considerable practical challenges.
Courts have so far shown little appetite for adopting use restrictions,
and altering Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to accommodate use
restrictions carries its own set of problems. On the other hand, if
legislatures create use restrictions, there is no need to worry about
maintaining a coherent legal doctrine, but there will be a considerable
amount of political resistance to overcome.
1. Use Restrictions in Case Law
For decades, the Supreme Court has focused on the collection of
data in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and the Court has
shown no signs that it is willing to change its focus. As noted above,
the Court has refused to adopt use restrictions in areas where they
would make the most sense, including the mosaic theory,231 DNA
databanks,232 and, with a few limited exceptions, special needs
searches.233
230. See Section III.B.2.
231. See supra Section II.A. See generally United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2014)
(applying a trespass analysis when deciding whether attaching a GPS device to a car and
monitoring the car’s movements for four weeks qualified as a search, while the plurality
suggested a mosaic theory, but none of the Justices proposed use restrictions).
232. See supra Section II.B; see also Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1962 (2013)
(allowing law enforcement to take DNA samples from felony arrestees).
233. See supra Section II.C; see also Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 494 U.S. 444,
450–51 (1990) (allowing suspicionless police roadblocks to check for drunk drivers); contra
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) (suggesting that the way the government
uses the data is a factor in determining whether the collection of the data is constitutional);
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To be fair, we have seen growing numbers of lower courts
turning to use restrictions to solve some of the modern problems
posed by technology and the Fourth Amendment: the Ninth Circuit
used a sequester type of use restriction when granting a warrant for
searching a computer;234 the Second Circuit applied an ongoing
seizure use restriction to the seizure and search of a hard drive;235 and
a District Court in Illinois imposed a use restriction on the collection
of phone numbers with a stingray device.236 So it is possible that some
forms of use restriction will ultimately be adopted by the Supreme
Court.
But even if the Supreme Court were willing to reorient its Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence to include use restrictions, a serious
doctrinal ambiguity would have to be resolved. It is relatively easy to
determine when the government collects evidence; even in the digital
age, it is obvious when the government takes possession of
information. Thus, it is relatively easy to create rules that restrict
when the government is allowed to collect information. But what,
exactly, constitutes a “use” of information? And at what point does
any specific use transform the government action into a Fourth
Amendment search?
These line-drawing questions are evident in some versions of the
data-processing model of use restrictions. Adopting these use
restrictions could be a useful way of evaluating government conduct
in the context of the mosaic theory, DNA databases, or encrypted
digital devices. In the latter two instances, courts can set out relatively
clear rules about which uses are permitted and which are not: testing
the DNA for any purpose other than to determine identity would
constitute a search, and using a password to open a digital device
would also constitute a search. But what types of data processing
constitute a forbidden use in the context of the mosaic theory?

Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79–81 (2001); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 n.7
(1989).
234. See supra notes 165–168 and accompanying text; see also United States v.
Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d 989, 1003 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (inserting a use
restriction into the search warrant).
235. See supra notes 174–183 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Ganias,
755 F.3d 125, 137 (2d Cir. 2014) (restricting the use of digital data once it was in the
possession of law enforcement).
236. See supra text accompanying note 188; see also In re Application of the U.S. for an
Order Relating to Tels. Used by Suppressed, No. 15-M-0021, 2015 WL 6871289, at *10
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2015).

96 N.C. L. REV. 133 (2017)

2017]

USE RESTRICTIONS

181

One answer would be for a court to hold that data processing
constitutes a search when the information it reveals infringes on the
suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy.237 But this will require a
whole new set of case law to explore what type of information
violates a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy and what does
not. For example, assume that under a use restrictions regime, the
government is allowed to collect and store all of our telephone and
email metadata—that is, it can keep a record of everyone we have
called or emailed over the past five years—but it cannot process this
data if the result of the data processing violates a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Checking the metadata of one phone call will
not violate this use restriction, since determining the name of one
person called does not infringe on a reasonable expectation of
privacy, at least as currently defined by the Supreme Court.238 But
beyond that easy case, courts will very quickly get embroiled in some
very challenging line-drawing questions. What if the government
throws tens of thousands of emails and telephone calls into an
algorithm and learns that a suspect called a therapist ten times in one
year? Or what if an analysis shows that at one point the defendant
called a criminal defense attorney six times in a forty-eight-hour
period? Or it could be that the analysis turns up nothing remotely
embarrassing or incriminating, but still gives police an outline of the
suspect’s communications pattern: 23% of his phone calls were to his
spouse; 32% were to colleagues at work; 5% were to college friends
who live out of town, and so on. At what point does the level of detail
infringe on an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy? More
importantly, how would the law enforcement agent who is conducting
the analysis know ahead of time whether the results would be so
personal that it would violate the suspect’s reasonable expectation of
privacy?
Another possible answer would be for courts to hold that certain
types of data processing automatically violate a suspect’s reasonable
expectation of privacy, regardless of what the results of the processing
might be. So, for instance, courts could determine that law
enforcement officers conduct a Fourth Amendment search any time
237. See, e.g., Logan, supra note 21, at 1605–06; Laurie Buchan Serafino, “I Know My
Rights, So You Go’n Need a Warrant for That”: The Fourth Amendment, Riley’s Impact,
and Warrantless Searches of Third-Party Clouds, 19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 154, 176, 181–
84 (2014) (arguing that a government inspection of data constitutes a search).
238. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979). Although Smith is much
maligned for its broad application of the third-party doctrine, its address/content
distinction has never been seriously challenged in the courts. Thus, address information
remains unprotected by the Fourth Amendment.
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they use at least ten days’ worth of location information from a cell
phone, or the metadata of a hundred different telephone calls, or
more than a thousand purchases on a credit card. These rules may be
an improvement on the current regime that focuses on the collection
of the data, but they will inevitably be arbitrary.
It will also be challenging to define the scope of permissible uses
for the future use restrictions that we see in the context of special
needs searches and binary searches. There are thousands of different
ways the government could use information that it collects, and courts
will need to rule on each of them to see if they fit into the special
needs category or the binary search category. In the special needs
context, courts will have to decide whether the government’s use of
the information is far enough removed from a law enforcement
purpose to make the search permissible.239 Some uses will be directly
related to a law enforcement purpose, such as using the results of a
breathalyzer in a prosecution for drunk driving, while others may be
more ambiguous, such as studying the driving patterns of self-driving
cars to learn if the car is being parked in an illegal parking spot. In the
binary search context, courts will have to decide how certain the
result of the machine’s analysis needs to be before the results can be
turned over to a law enforcement officer. Some machines may reveal
with near absolute certainty that criminal activity is occurring, such as
a gun detector that is 99.9% accurate and is used in a location where
firearms are prohibited, while others may only show a mere
probability that criminal activity is occurring, such as an analysis of
key words used in emails that are sent to known criminal associates.
In short, although use restrictions can help courts bypass some
tricky doctrinal issues with regard to collection restrictions and new
technology, they also create their own set of tricky doctrinal issues
that require resolution. This once again leads us to consider imposing
use restrictions through legislatures since legislatures have the
freedom to regulate law enforcement surveillance creatively, without
any need to tie the regulation to the language of the Fourth
Amendment or conform to a consistent jurisprudence. Unfortunately,
legislatures are more responsive to political pressures than courts, and
use restrictions could be a hard sell in many contexts.

239. As noted above in Section II.C., in theory, courts only approve of special needs
searches if they are conducted for a purpose other than law enforcement. See, e.g., Skinner
v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633–34 (1989) (allowing suspicionless drug
testing of railroad employees in order to ensure the safety of railway passengers).
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2. Statutory Use Restrictions
Legislatures have already adopted use restrictions in some
criminal law contexts. For example, the Foreign Intelligence Service
Act (“FISA”) sets out specific rules for conducting electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes.240 These rules are
different from (and arguably more lenient than) the rules for
conducting electronic surveillance for criminal law purposes.241 FISA
incorporates use restrictions in two ways: first, the agent seeking a
FISA order must certify that a “significant purpose of the surveillance
is to obtain foreign intelligence information,”242 which is an example
of a future use restriction; and second, the information cannot be used
in a routine criminal case unless a court certifies that the information
was lawfully obtained and the surveillance conformed with a court
order, which is an example of a very weak form of sequestering
restriction.243
The government also applies a sequestering version of a use
restriction in its tax collection system: in order to encourage complete
disclosure of income for tax purposes, the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”) keeps all tax returns confidential, and will not share them
with the immigration authorities to assist in identifying illegal aliens
or with the FBI to assist in criminal investigations.244
Thus, there are precedents to setting up statutory use restrictions
for policy reasons. In the FISA context, Congress has determined that
the enhanced need for information in the foreign intelligence context
requires a different standard for obtaining that information,245 while
in the IRS context, Congress believes that sequestering tax
information will encourage widespread and honest reporting of
income.246 This is similar to the motivation for many proposals for use

240. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(f), 1804(a) (2015).
241. Essentially, the FISA requirements provide a lower legal standard but require a
higher level of administrative approval than similar provisions under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act. See How the NSA’s Surveillance Procedures Threaten
America’s Privacy, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/fact-sheet/documents-confirm-how-nsassurveillance-procedures-threaten-americans-privacy [https://perma.cc/NM7V-LBLC].
242. See 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a).
243. See id. § 1806(g).
244. See I.R.C. § 6103 (2015); see also Kerr, supra note 8, at 7 (“The basic idea is that
the government is a ‘they’ not an ‘it,’ and limiting data sharing is essentially the same as
limiting data collection for individual groups and institutions with different roles within
the government.”).
245. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811.
246. See Disclosure Laws, IRS (last modified Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.irs.gov
/government-entities/federal-state-local-governments/disclosure-laws [https://perma.cc/XH6Y-
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restrictions in the criminal law context. For example, in the national
security context, Congress might decide that a particular risk is so
severe (such as the hijacking of an airplane) or a particular danger is
so immediate (such as an imminent terrorist attack) that the usual
collection restrictions on law enforcement should not apply.247 In the
broader context of special needs searches, the government might seek
information for a regulatory, non-criminal purpose, such as the
movement patterns of self-driving cars. Allowing the collection for a
national security or regulatory purpose but forbidding its use for law
enforcement purposes could make the initial collection of the data
more reasonable.
Unfortunately, these use restrictions are likely to be politically
unpopular, both among law enforcement officials and among the
general public. This would especially be true in the national security
context. Imagine the public reaction if the government identified a
potential terrorist and obtained incriminating evidence about him, but
then took no criminal action.248 Even in less dramatic cases, such as
drunk driving checkpoints or body camera footage, it may be hard to
convince the public of the wisdom of use restrictions. If the
government has evidence of criminal activity and yet does not arrest
or prosecute the perpetrator, it is likely that political pressure will be
brought to bear to weaken or even eliminate the use restrictions.
B.

Policy Problems

The second critique of use restrictions is more substantive than
political unpopularity. Although use restrictions promise to solve a
number of challenging modern search and seizure issues, they create
their own set of problems. First, widespread adoption of use
restrictions may have the unintended consequence of weakening
collection restrictions, or at least slowing the momentum to reforming
GBVC] (clarifying that the IRS cannot disclose tax information to law enforcement
officers without a court order); see also I.R.C. § 61013(j).
247. Of course, generally legislatures cannot weaken protections that are based on the
Fourth Amendment, so they would be unable to replace Fourth Amendment collection
restrictions with weaker, statutory-based use restrictions in the national security context.
But courts have been relatively deferential to legislatures in matters regarding foreign
intelligence and national security, so legislatures have more leeway in designing the proper
mix of collection restrictions and use restrictions in the national security context. See, e.g.,
United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir. 1973) (allowing suspicionless searches at
airports because of the enormous danger to lives and property and because hijackings
involve a “serious risk of complications in our foreign relations”).
248. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 107, 130 n.145 (2010) (“[A] prohibition on prosecuting terrorists who are caught in
an antiterrorist program would be very hard for the public to swallow.”).
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or broadening collection restrictions. Second, the mere fact that our
personal data is being collected and stored, even if there are legal
protections against it being used without court approval, could be
seen as overly invasive. And finally, on the other side of the
argument, aggressive adoption of use restrictions might go too far in
hampering law enforcement’s job in detecting and preventing crime.
1. The Law of Unintended Consequences: Use Limitations Would
Discourage Restrictions on Data Collection
Today, all Americans have their search queries and credit card
charges monitored, processed, and packaged by corporations;249 the
recipients and lengths of their phone calls catalogued;250 their
movements through public spaces recorded.251 Some of this
monitoring is done by the government; most of it is done by private
companies (who often turn over the information to the government
upon request).252 This trend shows every sign of increasing, with the
growing prevalence of smart devices, cloud storage, and other
methods by which private companies collect and store our
information.253
But the pervasive private and public surveillance of the modern
world is not just different in degree—it is different in kind. The inperson surveillance of past generations tended to overwhelmingly
focus on the poor and on ethnic minorities.254 This arguably resulted
in an underdeveloped legal opposition to government surveillance. If
the critical dilemma of surveillance law is how to balance privacy with
security, all too often this involved balancing one group’s privacy with
another group’s security. But now that is changing. The machines and
private companies that are assisting the government in building the
modern surveillance state engage in a much broader-based, even-

249. Henderson, supra note 25, at 704.
250. Id. at 704, 707.
251. Id. at 704–05.
252. Id. at 704–07; Amitai Etzioni, A Cyber Age Privacy Doctrine: A Liberal
Communitarian Approach, 10 I/S J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 641, 665 (2014).
253. Henderson, supra note 25, at 705–06.
254. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333,
333 (1998) (“[P]olice targeting of black people for excessive and disproportionate search
and seizure is a practice older than the Republic itself.”); Morrison, supra note 27, at 761
(“For migrants, minorities and the urban poor, universal visual surveillance would not
necessarily take away their privacy; they have already lost it.”); William J. Stuntz, The
Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1267 (1999)
(“[P]eople who have money have more Fourth Amendment protection than people who
don’t.”).
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handed surveillance.255 This will have—indeed, already is having—a
profound effect on popular attitudes about how much privacy people
are willing to cede to private companies and to law enforcement.256
Now that enfranchised classes are being subjected to heightened
levels of surveillance, the political impetus to create stricter
limitations on information gathering is growing.257 In other words, a
more uniform distribution of privacy infringement will naturally lead
to political pushback against this increased surveillance.258 Even the
courts may be more responsive to Fourth Amendment claims when
the surveillance affects every citizen.259
As we saw in the previous section, use restrictions may be one
way that this pushback occurs. When faced with the dilemma of
protecting privacy in the face of overwhelming levels of private and
255. See Morrison, supra note 27, at 762–64. Of course, modern surveillance techniques
may not result in a broader range of society being subject to surveillance. Many critiques
of big data are based on the concern that the machines and algorithms use data that is
already tainted by pre-existing bias in the criminal justice system. See, e.g., ANDREW
GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING 131–32 (2017) (“Police data
remains colored by explicit and implicit bias.”).
256. The revelations of the NSA’s mass surveillance program led to widespread
protests and ultimately culminated in a revision of the USA PATRIOT Act that limited
the authority of the NSA. See Heather Kelly, Protests Against the NSA Spring Up Across
U.S., CNN (July 5, 2013, 7:24 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/04/tech/web/restore-nsaprotests/ [https://perma.cc/7UTA-PN95]; see also USA FREEDOM Act, Pub. L. No. 11423, 129 Stat. 269 (2015) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
257. Writing in the context of ubiquitous drone surveillance, Professor Morrison notes:
If everyone were equally surveilled, it might achieve what Randall Kennedy
suggested some years ago: rather than burdening particular individuals with a
“racial tax,” universal surveillance would increase taxes across the board. It is the
same argument that can be made in favor of police checkpoints—everyone is a
little bit inconvenienced so that a few don’t have to be singled out and bear the
burden for everyone else.
In this sense, domestic drone surveillance’s greatest social and intellectual
contribution might not only be that it might help revitalize a generalized impetus
to protect privacy interests. It may also make us think more directly about the uses
and abuses of government power, a reality with which some of us—though
arguably few of those who write about these topics—are already intimately
familiar.
Morrison, supra note 27, at 761–62.
258. Henderson, supra note 20, at 555–59.
259. During the oral argument of United States v. Jones, Chief Justice Roberts asked
the government’s attorney whether he believed it would be a search if the government put
a GPS device on the cars of all the Supreme Court Justices and monitored all their
movements for a month. The government attorney answered in the affirmative. See
Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–10, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (No. 101259). The Court ultimately found against the government in a surprisingly unanimous
decision. Jones, 565 U.S. at 401.

96 N.C. L. REV. 133 (2017)

2017]

USE RESTRICTIONS

187

government data collection, courts and legislatures may abandon
efforts to control or regulate the surveillance itself and instead limit
government use of the information. Although this reaction may
increase citizens’ privacy rights in the short term, in the long term it
will almost certainly decrease the pressure on courts and legislatures
to craft meaningful restrictions on data collection.260 The result could
be a loosening of the restrictions on data collection, allowing the
government greater access to Americans’ personal information than
ever.261 Thus, the public will become more accustomed to mass
collection of data, and more tolerant of greater intrusions into our
private lives.
Current law already allows for mass collection of data in a
number of contexts. Surveillance cameras can constantly monitor
public places without any legal restrictions at all, and each one can
scan thousands or tens of thousands of people in a short period of
time. These cameras could use facial recognition software to identify
people with outstanding arrest warrants;262 they could also track who
is associating with whom in order to build a profile of a person’s
activity that could ultimately lead to a probable cause determination.
As noted above, current law allows for the collection of DNA
260. Some supporters of use restrictions see the loosening of collection restrictions as
an important step in ensuring that use restrictions are effective:
The best way to achieve the benefits of computer surveillance while minimizing
the privacy risks is to place greater focus on the later regulatory stages, and in
particular, the final stage of public disclosure. If computer surveillance is likely to
be effective, genuinely achieving a significant public good, widespread collection
and analysis is necessary to achieve those benefits. The law should respond by
adding new protections to the output end of the regulatory stage: The law should
allow the collection and manipulation of data, but then place significant limits on
the use and disclosure of the information.
Kerr, supra note 8, at 8.
261. Professor Christopher Slobogin makes this argument in the special needs context:
Freed from any [collection] restrictions on its antiterrorism efforts, the executive
branch might introduce numerous such programs, believing that, at the least,
bombs will be discovered and terrorists identified. . . . [T]his approach allows the
government to carry out other suspicionless “special needs” searches and seizures
as long as evidence thereby obtained is not used in a criminal court. Thus school
students can be suspended, illegal immigrants deported through a civil process,
and house residents subjected to civil fines based on dragnet stops and searches
without violating the Fourth Amendment, despite the thousands of innocent
individuals affected by drug testing, checkpoints, and health and safety
inspections, respectively.
Slobogin, supra note 248, at 130 n.145.
262. See John J. Brogan, Facing the Music: The Dubious Constitutionality of Facial
Recognition Technology, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 65, 80–81 (2002).
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samples from arrestees263 and the tracking of (at least some)
movements on public roads.264 More broadly, the third-party doctrine
theoretically allows the government to access enormous amounts of
information, such as telephony metadata, credit card purchases,
digital information stored in the cloud, or search engine requests.
There is, however, a growing sense that these doctrines need to
be reformed in the modern era in response the powerful data
collecting tools that are now available to law enforcement. One need
look no further than the two most recent Supreme Court cases that
dealt with technology and the Fourth Amendment. In United States v.
Jones, four concurring Justices adopted the mosaic theory and said
that there should be a limit on the government’s ability to collect
information about a person’s movements in public,265 while a fifth
Justice called into question the entire third-party doctrine.266 In Riley
v. California, all nine Justices held that cell phones contain such a
large amount of information that they are immune from the search
incident to lawful arrest exception to the warrant requirement.267
Widespread adoption of use restrictions could blunt or even halt
this call for reform. If the courts create strong barriers in how the
government is permitted to use this information, they will face less
pressure to limit the collection of this information. If the information
that the government obtained is limited at the use stage, why bother
to untangle the thicket of the third-party doctrine just to protect
information that can only be used if it belongs to criminals? Likewise,
why try to solve all the difficult problems posed by the mosaic theory
if we can protect citizens at the back end of the investigation instead?
The same benefits and simplicity of use restrictions that make them
attractive will also likely lead courts to rely on them exclusively in
these challenging cases.
In time, we may begin to see use restrictions that not only
supplement the current regime of collection restrictions, but that
begin to replace the current regime of collection restrictions. For
example, assume that the government develops a binary-search gun
detector like the one described in a previous Section,268 that can
detect the presence of a concealed firearm and then sends a message

263. See supra text accompanying notes 80–81.
264. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983) (allowing the government
to monitor the movement of a car during one trip over public roads).
265. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429–31 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
266. Id. at 254 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
267. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484–85 (2014).
268. Supra Section II.G.
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to the user only if a firearm is present. This detector would be quite
effective if the government were able to use it indiscriminately in any
context in which concealed firearms are illegal. But courts would only
permit this kind of indiscriminate use if they held that machine
observation alone does not constitute a search. This in itself is a
controversial claim—a court could easily hold that a “search” is
occurring when a government-controlled machine obtains
information.269 But assuming the courts adopt such a position, the
implications are somewhat troubling. If the government cannot look
at the information without a warrant, courts may be persuaded to
allow the government to collect and store all sorts of data information
stored on our cell phones or computers, the content of our telephone
conversations or emails; all of this could potentially be collected by
machines under the theory that human beings will never see it unless
there is evidence of criminal activity.
2. Panvasive Surveillance and the Panopticon—The Consequences
of Allowing the Government to Collect and Store the Data
The second problem with use restrictions is that they may not
truly protect our privacy in any meaningful way. The mere collection
and storage of data infringes on our privacy by creating a chilling
effect on our activities. Meanwhile, rogue government officials could
abuse their positions by violating use restrictions, for either
professional or personal reasons. And finally, use restrictions may not
last forever—a doctrinal shift by courts or a political shift in the
legislatures could mean that all of the information that the
government has collected and stored would no longer be protected.
Privacy law experts are divided about how effective use
restrictions can be in protecting our privacy.270 Use restrictions are
relatively popular tools in the civil privacy realm, under the theory
that much of the harm from a loss of privacy comes from the way the
269. At least one commentator has argued that “information disclosed only to an
automated system remains ‘private’ as that word is commonly used and as it is used in
Fourth Amendment law.” Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96
IOWA L. REV. 581, 611–12 (2011). This would be consistent with current case law. For
example, the Supreme Court has held that a government-controlled dog that sniffs the
defendant’s property does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search (even though the
dog itself learns many private things about the suspect when she conducts the sniff)
because the human handler learns nothing other than the presence or absence of
contraband. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2005). By analogy, a machine
(whether it is a gun detector or a software sniffer) that “learns” a lot of private
information about a suspect is not conducting a search because the human learns nothing
other than the presence or absence of contraband.
270. Thanks to Craig Konnoth for helping me to navigate through this debate.
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once-private information is used once it is obtained.271 Private
information can be used to steal someone’s identity, discriminate
against a person based on race or religion, or damage a person’s
reputation.272 We also count on having exclusive use of our private
information to control how we interact with the general public, our
professional colleagues, and our most intimate friends.273 And finally,
controlling the use of our own information allows us freedom to
adopt idiosyncratic or counter-majoritarian beliefs or attitudes
without risk of societal or legal repercussions.274
All of these concerns are arguably assuaged by a robust
application of use restrictions. If an individual can know with
complete confidence that use restrictions would ensure that her
private information would not be shared or misused, she would be
agnostic as to whether it was collected or stored. This argument has
moved many privacy experts away from collection restrictions and
towards use restrictions. President Obama’s Council of Advisors on
Science and Technology released a report which argued that “[p]olicy
attention should focus more on the actual uses of big data and less on
its collection and analysis.”275
But some privacy scholars disagree. In one of the seminal works
on privacy, Professor Daniel Solove provides a taxonomy of privacy
violations, which lists four categories of violations: information
collection, information processing, information dissemination, and
invasion.276 Use restrictions can only protect an individual against the
second and third category of privacy violations; as Professor Solove
argues: “Even if no information is revealed publicly, information
271. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Big Data Before and After Snowden, 7 J. NAT’L SEC. L. &
POL’Y 333, 335–37 (2014).
272. See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 78 (Stanford Univ. Press ed.,
2010).
273. See, e.g., FERDINAND DAVID SHOEMAN, Privacy and Intimate Information, in
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 403, 406 (Ferdinand David
Shoeman ed., 1984); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 476–83 (1968).
274. See Nissenbaum, supra note 2722, at 82.
275. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. AND TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: BIG DATA AND PRIVACY: A
TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default
/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_big_data_and_privacy_-_may_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8YC2-9BFP]. Policymakers have also moved to alter Fair Information Practice Principles
towards use restrictions and away from collection restrictions. See Fred H. Cate, Peter
Cullen, & Victor Mayer-Schönberger, Data Protection Principles for the 21st Century
Revising the 1980 OECD Guidelines, OXFORD INTERNET INST. (Mar. 2014),
http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/publications/Data_Protection_Principles_for_the_21st_Century.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W2AA-MTA3].
276. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 490 (2006).
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collection can create harm.”277 Professor Solove focuses on the
discomfort that individuals generally feel when they know they are
being monitored, as well as the chilling effect that will deter them
from saying or doing unconventional things.278 To be fair, individuals
may feel less of this discomfort or chilling effect if they are only being
monitored by machines, but even under the most strict and limited
use restriction regime, individuals would know that it was possible
that the information that was being collected could be seen and used
by a human being.
And of course most use restriction regimes do not promise that
nobody will see the information; only that its disclosure will be
limited to certain people and/or to fulfill certain purposes.279 Many
versions of use restrictions merely bar law enforcement from using
the information in a criminal prosecution; this does not mean that law
enforcement officers cannot ever have access to it.280 For example,
law enforcement officers may be permitted to use the data to
determine which individuals are persons of interest, so that they can
focus resources on those people. And even if there is a strict
sequestration from all law enforcement personnel, many of the
proposed use restrictions would allow some member of the
government to see the information, perhaps for regulatory purposes.
This would undoubtedly have a chilling effect on an individual’s
statements and actions.281
As noted above,282 the Supreme Court seems to agree with the
proposition that the mere collection of information, regardless of how
or whether it is used, can be a violation of privacy. In Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,283 the Supreme Court noted that its precedents
277. Id. at 491.
278. Id. at 499 (footnote omitted) (“[P]ublic surveillance can have chilling effects that
make people less likely to associate with certain groups, attend rallies, or speak at
meetings. Espousing radical beliefs and doing unconventional things takes tremendous
courage; the attentive gaze, especially the government’s, can make these acts seem all the
more daring and their potential risks all the more inhibitory.”).
279. For example, the “sequestration” model of use restrictions would allow certain
law enforcement agencies to have access to the information; likewise, the “future use”
model would, by definition, allow the government to use the information for certain
approved purposes. See supra Sections I.A.4, I.A.5.
280. See for example the use restriction imposed by the warrant in United States v.
Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 139 (2d Cir. 2014), vacated, 791 F.3d 290 (2015) (mem.); see also
supra notes 174–83 and accompanying text.
281. See Henderson, supra note 149, at 962 (“[K]nowing that all of our movements,
online or off, will be recorded for potential observation can very meaningfully chill those
actions.”).
282. Supra Section III.B.1.
283. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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have acknowledged a “private realm of family life which the state
cannot enter.”284 And in the criminal law context, the Supreme Court
recently recognized this problem in Birchfield v. North Dakota,285 a
case in which the Court struck down state laws that imposed criminal
penalties if a driver suspected of drunk driving refused to take a
blood test.286 In contrasting blood tests to breath tests, the Court
noted that the blood sample from blood alcohol tests can be
preserved by the state, and that the state could conduct further tests
to learn intimate information about the suspect.287 Even if use
restrictions were put into place to forbid the government from
conducting any further tests of the suspect’s blood, “the potential [for
such tests] remains and may result in anxiety for the person tested.”288
This leads to the second, related problem with relying upon use
restrictions: none of them will be foolproof. Once the information is
stored in government databases, individual government officials could
conceivably gain access to it, even if such access is unauthorized
under law. A rogue government official could use the information for
professional purposes, such as to help guide a criminal investigation,
or for personal purposes, such as to learn information about an exspouse, neighbor, or friend.289 Often, unauthorized access would take
place in secret and neither the victim nor other government
employees would even know that it occurred—but everyone would
know at the collection stage that the potential for such disclosure
existed. Even if the misuse is not intentional, officials in charge of the
information could mistakenly allow it to end up in the wrong hands.290
284. Id. at 851 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
285. 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).
286. Id. at 2178.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. For example, in United States v. Czubinski, an IRS employee routinely accessed
confidential IRS databases without authorization. 106 F.3d 1069, 1071–72 (1997). He
looked up tax returns of his political opponents, his girlfriend, a prosecutor who had
investigated his father, and many other social acquaintances. Id.
290. A useful analogy can be made with medical information, which is strictly
protected by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). A
recent investigation by ProPublica revealed that the Department of Veteran’s Affairs
alone was responsible for more than 10,000 privacy violations between 2011 and 2015. See
Annie Waldman & Charles Ornstein, Privacy Violations Rising At Veterans Affairs
Medical Facilities, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2015/12/30/461400692/patient-privacy-isn-t-safeguarded-at-veterans-medical-facilities
[https://perma.cc/32T3-UJY5]. A recent article in the Berkeley Medical Journal noted that
[although] some violations of HIPAA are maliciously willful, much leakage of
private information is accidental. The wide range of communications available to
parties throughout various healthcare entities exposes significant risks. Familiar
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The government’s information databases would also be
vulnerable to private parties who could illegally gain access to the
data, observe it, and then disclose it or use it for their own purposes.
Cyberattacks on credit card companies, retail stores, and banks are
relatively common in today’s world;291 there is no way to ensure that
the massive amounts of data being collected and stored by the
government for future use would be immune from such intrusions.292
Finally, there is always the danger that government policy will
change and that use restrictions will be weakened or eliminated. At
that point, law enforcement will have an enormous amount of
information that was essentially collected under false pretenses—
under a promise that it would never be used by the police. Arguably,
the larger the database grows, the more pressure the government will
be under to loosen the use restrictions so that the government can use
the information to achieve its goals. It is not hard to imagine a
dramatic event—a terrorist attack, a sharp increase in crime, a
credible threat of danger—that could push policymakers to change
the laws.
All of these concerns translate into a significant and justified
political resistance to the widespread collection of our private
information. The American public would likely not feel comfortable
if the government had a complete DNA database of every citizen,
even if the government could not access the database without a

sources of information leakage may include exposed documents on desks,
uncollected output from fax machines and printers, improperly disposed
documents, or a lost laptop or USB memory card or stick. With the popularity of
social networking, the potential for HIPAA violations is magnified through
personal blogs of healthcare workers or information posted in Facebook or other
social networking sites. Even an activity as mundane as discussing in public areas
information regarding a patient may represent a significant source of information
leakage.
Lauren Mock, When Patient Health Information Leaks, ISSUES BERKELEY MED. J. (2012),
https://issues.berkeley.edu/articles/20.1_Mock_L_Patient_Health_Information_Leaks
_HIPAA.html [https://perma.cc/JG2M-9XGX]. The same concerns would exist for any
government-held private information, regardless of how many legal protections are put
into place.
291. See Jim Finkle & Mark Hosenball, Exclusive: More Well-Known U.S. Retailers
Victims of Cyber Attacks, REUTERS (Jan. 11, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/ustarget-databreach-retailers-idUSBREA0B01720140112 [https://perma.cc/W2VB-ELRY];
John O’Donnell & Alexander Winning, Banks Reinforce Cyber Defences After Global
Attack, REUTERS (May 15, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/cyber-banksidUSL2N1IH1K6 [https://perma.cc/EZF6-UAZJ].
292. See Paul McLaughlin, Crypto Wars 2.0: Why Listening to Apple on Encryption
Will Make America More Secure, 30 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 353, 380 (2016).
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warrant.293 Similarly, the government would encounter strong
resistance if it sought the password into the backdoor of every digital
device that we owned, even if it would be legally prohibited from
using the password without a court order.
In short, a regime in which use restrictions replace collection
restrictions will carry serious risks to our privacy. And yet many use
restrictions (such as those on binary searches, or those involving the
mosaic theory) are only effective if they replace front-end collection
restrictions so that the government can access the data when
permitted to do so.
3. Limiting Law Enforcement
The final critique of use restrictions comes from the other end of
the political spectrum: they may unduly hamper law enforcement
efforts to detect and prevent crime. This critique can be applied to
attempts to impose use restrictions on previously unregulated
surveillance, such as collecting telephone metadata, tracking public
activities, recording activity with police body cameras, or obtaining
information from third parties. In all of these areas, law enforcement
officials are eager to use new technologies to further their criminal
investigations, and use restrictions will discourage or even prevent
such use. As noted above,294 barring this evidence from criminal cases
will likely make these use restrictions politically unpalatable, but it
would also arguably be bad policy.
This Article has already discussed the policy problems that
would arise if the courts imposed use restrictions in the special needs
context.295 On the one hand, use restrictions would be an effective
way to bypass the disingenuous nature of many of the Court’s special
needs cases. Courts have approved drug testing in schools,296 drunk
driving checkpoints,297 or searches at airports298 based on the dubious
premise that these searches serve needs unrelated to law
enforcement. Use restrictions could turn this legal fiction into reality,
by ensuring that any information obtained by law enforcement can
only be used for the non-law enforcement purpose (protecting a
conducive learning environment, keeping roadways safe, preventing
293. See Arnold H. Loewy, A Proposal for the Universal Collection of DNA, 48 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 261, 262–63 (2015).
294. See supra text accompanying note 248.
295. See supra Sections III.B.1, III.B.2.
296. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 347–48 (1985).
297. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
298. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1973).

96 N.C. L. REV. 133 (2017)

2017]

USE RESTRICTIONS

195

terrorism) and not used in criminal proceedings against the suspect.
But imposing use restrictions would potentially mean that individuals
who sell drugs in school, drive while intoxicated, or attempt to bring
firearms or explosives onto airplanes would all be immune from
prosecution. Thus, although it may appear unjust to some people, it
will also weaken the deterrence value of the work done by law
enforcement officers.
Police officer body cameras are another example of how use
restrictions could unduly impede law enforcement duties. There is
currently a robust debate about how to handle the massive amount of
video footage being compiled by body cameras.299 Many advocates
have raised concerns about the privacy rights of the individuals—
innocent and guilty—who are caught on camera.300 Much of what
police officers see—and which is captured by their body cameras—is
private information, taking place inside someone’s home, or involving
verbal descriptions of intimate or potentially embarrassing
situations.301 Thus, there are privacy concerns if the general public is
able to view this information indiscriminately, and use restrictions can
be imposed to prevent public dissemination.
Some commentators have registered concern with using body
camera footage in criminal investigations, even though existing frontend collection restrictions already ensure that the footage is
inadmissible if the recording officer was violating the Fourth
Amendment. As Professor Stephen Henderson has pointed out:
[H]igh quality cameras would record all sorts of events and
details never noticed by the officers, and potentially
permanently store them for later high-tech perusal (e.g., zoom
in and slow down). Moreover, for things an officer does
notice . . . the digital record will remain forever pristine,
whereas memories quickly degrade and even fade entirely.302

299. See, e.g., McKenzie Funk, Should We See Everything a Cop Sees? N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/23/magazine/police-bodycameras.html [https://perma.cc/4LES-WT76 (dark archive)].
300. See, e.g., Jay Stanley, Police Body-Mounted Cameras: With Right Policies In Place,
A Win for ALL, ACLU (Mar. 2015), https://www.aclu.org/other/police-body-mountedcameras-right-policies-place-win-all [https://perma.cc/9K58-HQVD].
301. See Henderson, supra note 149, at 964 (“Such cameras would record not ‘only’
events taking place in public, but instead would record everywhere officers go, including
the interiors of our homes and therefore potentially under every bed and into every
dresser.”).
302. Id. (footnotes omitted). Professor Henderson also recommends “security from
unauthorized access, need-to-know limitations, audit logs, and destructions schedules.” Id.
at 970.
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Thus, body cameras do more than just record what an officer is
already allowed to see under the Fourth Amendment; the cameras act
as sort of an observer-on-steroids—seeing everything, forgetting
nothing. Under this view, body cameras are an overly invasive type of
investigation that is not sufficiently covered by collection restrictions.
Once again, use restrictions seem like an elegant solution to this
problem: record everything, even the most intimate details that may
have been unnoticed by the officer herself, but restrict access to the
footage by requiring the police to show probable cause or obtain a
warrant before viewing the footage.303
But imposing such a restriction would severely blunt the strong
potential that body cameras have to assist law enforcement officers in
investigating crimes. A warrant requirement would not be so onerous
when the prosecutor wanted to obtain footage of the defendant
actually committing the crime for which he is currently being
charged—in such cases, probable cause would be easy to establish and
the video footage would provide an excellent source of evidence for
the jury. But for long-term investigations, law enforcement officers
may need to review over hundreds of hours of footage, to spot
patterns in behavior or take note of facts that may not have been
obvious to the officer who was wearing the camera. The very features
that arguably make body cameras overly intrusive—the ability to
capture minute details and preserve those details forever—make
them invaluable to police investigators who are pursuing these
investigations. Requiring a warrant before allowing police access to
this data would seriously hamper these legitimate efforts.
Yet another example can be found in applying use restrictions to
the third party doctrine. As with the rules governing binary searches,
the third party doctrine represents a jurisprudence which initially
made sense when it was developed in an earlier era, but which has
transformed into a doctrine which allows law enforcement officers
access to the millions of pieces of data that we all share with private
companies. The potential privacy intrusions created by the third party
doctrine have only been exacerbated in recent years as the
government has improved its data processing abilities. Use
restrictions appear to provide a solution to this dilemma: allow law
enforcement officers access to this data, thus keeping the third-party
doctrine intact, but force them to obtain a warrant—or some kind of
court authorization—before they can process the data to detect
patterns and learn intimate facts about the suspect.
303. Id. at 970–71.
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Privacy advocates would no doubt cheer such a development, but
law enforcement officers will correctly point out that such a rule
would create an odd dissonance between the rights of law
enforcement and the rights of private commercial entities. Private
companies, the very entities who are collecting this information, can
buy, sell, and process this data with impunity. They do so in order to
maximize their profits, by marketing products to us with greater
precision, engaging in price discrimination, and developing new
products that they believe we will purchase.304 Creating use
restrictions for law enforcement officers will mean that companies
will be able to use this information to further their own profit-seeking
goals, while law enforcement officers will not be able to use the
information in order to engage in legitimate crime control.
Of course, on one level this dissonance is nothing new: private
parties have never been subject to the Fourth Amendment and so
they have always faced fewer constitutional restrictions than law
enforcement officers. But for the most part private parties face some
kind of legal restrictions that are equal to or even greater than those
imposed on law enforcement. Private parties are not allowed to
trespass on our private property, search our clothes or our belongings,
hack into our computers, or eavesdrop on our telephone
conversations. As the recent plurality decision in United States v.
Jones pointed out, Fourth Amendment restrictions have historically
been tied to notions of common law trespass.305 If anything,
government agents have had more power to intrude on our privacy
than private parties: law enforcement agents can search through open
fields;306 detain us and frisk us if they have reasonable suspicion of a
crime;307 and (unlike private parties) obtain court orders to enter our
homes or wiretap our phones without our consent.308 It would thus be
anomalous to give private companies unlimited power to process and
use the data they collect, but to prohibit the government from doing
so unless they obtained permission from a court.309
304. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 25, at 706 (describing how “Target’s analytics
department managed to piece together when a customer is pregnant . . . because such a
significant life event shakes up our otherwise routine habits.”).
305. 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012).
306. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 184 (1984).
307. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968).
308. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2012) (allowing the government to wiretap phones if they
receive the appropriate court order).
309. One response to this critique, of course, would be to impose similar use
restrictions on how private companies can process or use our data, thus putting private
companies and law enforcement on similar footing. Another response would be to point
out that it is appropriate to put greater restrictions on the government than on private
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CONCLUSION
For all their promise and potential, use restrictions are deeply
problematic. The Supreme Court has consistently refused to
incorporate them into its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, even in
cases in which they would provide a solution to the problem at hand.
Legislatures will find them politically challenging to enact: those on
the left will argue that they will supplant or discourage robust
collection restrictions, and thus will result the government collecting
and storing massive amounts of our intimate data; those on the right
will protest the fact that information that proves criminal activity (or
could, with proper data mining, lead to such proof), is kept out of the
hands of law enforcement. And from a policy standpoint, use
restrictions could impede the development of more robust collection
restrictions, while allowing the government to collect and store
massive amounts of data that would be vulnerable to misuse in a
variety of ways.
But the term “use restrictions” is quite broad, encompassing
many different types of surveillance regulation. These different types
of use restrictions vary in degrees of scope, effect, and legal authority;
thus, one-size-fits all proposals or critiques are not particularly useful.
In particular, there is one type of modest use restriction that has a
sound legal basis, is relatively easy to implement, and does not carry
the same danger as most of the other: the use restrictions that are
written into warrants by magistrates or trial judges. This type of use
restriction presents no doctrinal difficulties: judicial officers have
always had the power to limit the scope of warrants that they issue,
and so restricting the information obtained through a warrant (either
the sequester model or the ongoing seizure model) does not require
any reevaluation of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. These use
restrictions can be applied on a case-by-case basis in any situation in
which the government needs to apply for a warrant, such as to search
digital devices or using stingrays or other surveillance tools to
intercept electronic communication. Eventually, appellate courts
could even write these limitations into law, arguing that these
necessarily overbroad searches are only constitutional if they are
parties because the government has much greater power over individuals; unlike private
companies, the government has the coercive power of the state. However, the criminal
justice system responds to this power imbalance by creating limitations on the use of this
state power—for example, the Fourth Amendment requires government agents to obtain
a warrant before conducting most searches, see United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,
106 (1965), and requires reasonable suspicion before government agents can seize an
individual, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968).
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accompanied by the appropriate use restriction. This will also create
uniformity among the different lower court judges, providing them
with guidance as to when such use restrictions are required and how
they should be structured.
But until the practical and legal problems with use restrictions
can be resolved, courts and legislatures should resist adopting use
restrictions in any other context. Law enforcement officers will
routinely offer to submit to use restrictions in exchange for the ability
to engage in overbroad searches, such as collecting DNA information,
conducting searches for national security purposes, and obtaining
third party information. At this point, courts and legislatures should
confine use restrictions to a case-by-case basis in individual warrants,
and focus instead on reforming the rules on collection restrictions in
order to deal with the growing challenges created by new surveillance
technologies.
We know that law enforcement officers, for legitimate reasons,
have an insatiable appetite for collecting information, and modern
tools for amassing and processing data will only increase this appetite.
At first, use restrictions appear to be a reasonable way of navigating
this new world: if the drive to collect information is unstoppable, and
the current Fourth Amendment restrictions on collecting the
information are outdated or insufficient, then it appears logical to
give up on the collection stage and protect our rights at the stage
where it seems to matter the most—when the information is actually
being observed by a law enforcement official or used against us in
court. But in reality, most use restrictions promise more than they can
deliver.

